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THE RAGGED EDGE OF RUGGED INDIVIDUALISM: WAGE 
THEFT AND THE PERSONALIZATION OF SOCIAL HARM
By Matthew Fritz-Mauer*
ABSTRACT
Every year, millions of low-wage workers suffer wage theft when their employers 
refuse to pay them what they have earned. Wage theft is both prevalent and highly 
impactful. It costs individuals thousands each year in unpaid earnings, siphons 
tens of billions of dollars from low-income communities, depletes the government of 
necessary resources, distorts the competitive labor market, and causes significant 
personal harm to its victims. In recent years, states and cities have passed new 
laws to attack the problem. These legal changes are important. They are also, 
broadly speaking, failing the people they are supposed to protect.
This Article fills a significant gap in the literature by detailing the full scope of 
damage caused by wage theft and by critically examining the dominant approach 
to combatting it. Drawing on existing research and nearly 60 in-depth interviews 
about wage theft in the District of Columbia, this Article paints a thorough picture 
of wage theft’s harms, explores why and how existing reforms are failing, and 
explains what must be done instead.
Enforcement schemes reflect the current view that wage theft is a personal harm 
properly addressed on a case-by-case basis in the civil justice system. As a result, 
reforms—both as written and implemented—generally attempt to empower and 
incentivize individuals to action. These approaches are failing. They 
misunderstand what wage theft is, how it plays out, and how it must be 
addressed. Wage theft is not an individual problem, but a social harm, and it 
therefore requires a broad, public response. Because low-wage workers live 
economically precarious lives and are so dependent on their jobs to survive, they 
almost never take formal legal action over violations of their rights. Government 
bodies cannot continue to rely on workers themselves to enforce their rights, but 
must take on a new role as robust, active, and strategic enforcers. Unless and 
until they do, millions of people will continue to suffer violations of their basic 
workplace rights with no meaningful recourse.
* Associate attorney, The Kelman Buescher Law Firm; J.D., University of California, 
Irvine School of Law (2015); Ph.D., Department of Criminology, Law and Society, University 
of California, Irvine (2019). I owe significant thanks to Carroll Seron, Mario Barnes, Valerie 
Jenness, and Kaaryn Gustafson, who have always provided excellent, supportive, and critical 
feedback. My employers also deserve great credit for creating an environment that gives me 
the personal and intellectual space to pursue this kind of work.
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INTRODUCTION
For eighteen months, Cora did all the grunt work at Eclectic 
Coif,1 an upscale men’s salon in Washington, D.C. that charges $70 
a haircut.2 She cleaned the bathrooms, washed and folded the 
laundry, swept the floors, made coffee, and shampooed up to 80
clients a day. It was not glamorous work. Sometimes it was down-
right disgusting, actually, like when the basement flooded from a 
backed-up sewage line and she had to clean it up. But Cora was a 
Marine. She had gone through boot camp. She prides herself on 
her toughness, her willingness to go the extra mile to accomplish 
the mission. The work might have been undignified, but Cora was
not a quitter. Besides, she needed the money.
It was not much money. Ten dollars an hour, plus tips. A far cry 
from where Cora had been a few years earlier, working at a large 
law firm and making $56,000 a year plus benefits. Not bad for a 
single mom without a college degree. Not bad for a woman who, 
when we met, was $10,000 behind on her rent and struggling to 
find a job.
What happened to Cora during the Great Recession of 2008 is 
what happened to a lot of people: her employer downsized. Her 
entire department moved to another state, and she was not invited 
along. Things took a turn after that. Cora’s lifestyle and friends 
changed over time, and her old career was not calling her back. So, 
she moved away from the corporate legal world and into the jobs 
she could find, which is how she wound up working for $10 an 
hour plus tips.
There was a problem, though: hardly anybody tipped her. In a 
given ten-hour shift, Cora washed 50 to 80 heads of hair. A few cli-
ents might tip, but sometimes an entire workday would go by with-
out anything. Most of the time, Cora earned less than the mini-
mum wage.3
1. Throughout this Article, I have given pseudonyms to low-wage workers, their em-
ployers, and their coworkers. The attorneys, workers’ rights activists, employers, and gov-
ernment agents who participated typically chose to identify themselves. Where I use a per-
son’s first name only, it is a pseudonym; where I use a first and last name, it is not.
2. Interview with Cora, Low-wage Worker, in Washington, D.C. (2018) (transcript on 
file with author).
3. This is not how tipped jobs are supposed to work, especially at a place like Eclectic 
Coif. Businesses in the District of Columbia are allowed to pay their tipped employees below 
the regular minimum wage, as long as over the course of a workweek those employees earn, 
on average, at least the minimum wage for every hour that they work. See Wage and Hour 
Laws, D.C. OFF. ATT’Y GEN., https://oag.dc.gov/workers-rights/wage-and-hour-laws 
[https://perma.cc/VK89-NY2K]. When they do not, the employer is required to cut the 
worker a check for the difference between her actual hourly rate and what the minimum 
wage requires.
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Cora tried talking to Charlotte, the salon’s business manager, 
but it was a dead end. “The tips will come,” Charlotte assured her. 
“Just keep doing the job.” This was no solace, to say the least, and it 
did not pay the bills. The minimum wage violations were constant, 
but there were other violations, too. Cora never got paid overtime, 
and she sometimes got paid late. One time when her wages were 
late, she asked Charlotte where her money was. Charlotte threat-
ened to fire her.
This wage theft took a toll on the former Marine. “It was just so 
frustrating,” says Cora. Charlotte’s response made her feel worth-
less, and dismissed. 
I couldn’t pay my rent. . . . [E]very two weeks I’d get paid, 
that check would go right to my landlord. So then my tips, 
my little bitty tips, were what I needed to eat, to literally go 
into the grocery store. . . . I would have to get on the train 
and go out to Maryland and shop because the prices were 
lower.
But transportation costs money. Everything costs money. Cora was 
working full time, supporting only herself, and every week she 
struggled to put food on the table.
At 45, Cora had had a career, she had raised a child, and she 
couldn’t even make minimum wage. But what could she do? “I
knew that I wasn’t making enough and it wasn’t fair,” she says, “but 
I didn’t have the knowledge or the strength to go after [my wages], 
to fight for myself.” Depression settled in and got worse over time. 
“One day it was really bad. It was like suicidal thoughts, you know? 
And when I felt that, that cold from the knife on my wrist, I was 
like, ‘Whoa! That’s a little too far . . . you gotta, really gotta get 
some help.’ ” Finally, she began to see a therapist.
But after a year and a half of wage theft, Cora’s work ethic finally 
cracked. “I think I basically just got myself fired because I had giv-
en up, you know? They weren’t tipping me and they weren’t paying 
me.” Her work slipped. She stopped putting forth her Marine-best. 
When Charlotte terminated her, Cora felt relief. Seeing no other 
options, she just tried to move on.
* * *
As a journeyman plumber with 21 years of experience, Earl has 
real expertise.4 His skills are sought after in a constantly-growing
4. Interview with Earl, Journeyman Plumber, in Washington, D.C. (2018) (transcript
on file with author).
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city, and he is capable of earning a high hourly rate. In fact, he has 
at times brought home $40 an hour, enough to provide a decent 
living.
Earl’s ability to make middle-class wages is, unfortunately, often 
just theoretical. In Earl’s experience, construction contractors un-
dercut even their skilled workers. Throughout his career, employ-
ers have denied him overtime, misclassified him as an independent 
contractor, refused to pay him what they promised, and even re-
fused to pay him anything at all. Once, for example, an employer 
told him he would be making $40 an hour. That all changed when 
he started work. “I ended up getting somewhere around $18,” he 
explains, “[s]o it was either [a] take it or leave it thing.” He took it.
It was better than sitting at home collecting unemployment, and 
Earl is a man who takes pride in working.
In the grand scheme of things, these offenses are relatively rare. 
Most jobs pass without any drama. But because he can earn a high 
hourly rate, this wage theft costs Earl a lot of money. When his 
employers cut his hourly rate in half or refuse to pay overtime, he 
experiences a double-digit-per-hour dollar reduction. Beyond that, 
the principle bothers him. Earl knows his rights and he knows what 
is fair, and his employers’ casual disregard of both is extremely 
frustrating.
When employers cheat him, though, Earl’s only response is to 
argue and then, if he can, avoid working for them in the future. 
Only once has he tried to pursue legal action, and that was because 
a contractor refused to pay him anything. He cannot afford a law-
yer, does not have any legal training, and does not know how to 
bring a wage claim. “Where do you take your complaint?” he asks. 
“Do you take it to the city? . . . Where do I go? Who do I complain 
to?”
But the lack of information isn’t the real barrier. Earl is more 
than capable of figuring out where to go. In his view, the govern-
ment is not interested in taking action unless somebody makes a 
report. When I ask whether he has ever considered doing that, he 
laughs. “Okay,” he says patiently, “if you step forward, what are the 
odds? You’re outnumbered with all the contractors here, and then 
you’ll be scapegoated. You won’t be able to get no work. You won’t
be able to find a job. You won’t be able to get nothing. So how do 
you step forward?”
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* * *
In early 2018, Arbalis offered Olivia a job in charge of the organ-
ization’s programming.5 The salary was not great—$35,000 a year, 
no benefits—but she believed in the non-profit’s mission.
Though only 28, Olivia’s resume is impressive. She speaks four
languages (English, Bengali, Hindi, and some German), has two 
master’s degrees, and carries herself with an air of professional 
competence. At first it seemed like the Arbalis Founder and Presi-
dent, Steven, recognized her value. He praised her effusively in the 
offer letter and spoke in idealistic, inspiring ways about the job.
Olivia’s opinion of the job quickly soured. The days were longer 
than promised, and the low pay began to grate after 50 hours a 
week. Worse, though, Steven was hard to work for. He nitpicked 
her work, made condescending and racist comments, and blamed 
Olivia for things that she felt were not her fault. Olivia began to 
look for other jobs, but things came to a head when she took a sick 
day.
Steven responded badly. He insisted she was violating workplace 
rules and unlawfully demanded a doctor’s note.6 Olivia refused, 
explaining that she could not afford to see a doctor. Steven fired 
her, refused to pay Olivia her final wages, and, when she demand-
ed them, escalated his threats. He accused her of a litany of imag-
ined offenses and threatened legal action. If Steven sued Olivia, he 
promised she would be liable for more than $150,000 in damages. 
Worst of all, he told her she had committed an unnamed felony 
that, he claimed, carried a five-year prison term and $250,000 fine.
These were stunning threats, especially for a recent immigrant 
with little savings and no knowledge of the American legal system. 
The experience was deeply upsetting and strained her relationship 
with her husband. “I’m depressed and unhappy because of this 
whole situation,” Olivia says. “I don’t really feel like going any-
where or doing anything.”
Olivia found a new and better job, but Steven continued to re-
fuse to pay her. She contacted several attorneys, but none would 
take her case. Her claim, worth about $2,400 in unpaid wages, was 
just too small.
With nowhere else to turn, Olivia filed a wage claim with the Dis-
trict of Columbia Department of Employment Services (DOES). 
The experience was an exercise in frustration. She learned that the 
5. Interview with Olivia, Non-profit Emp., in Washington, D.C. (2018) (transcript on 
file with author).
6. See D.C. CODE § 32-531.04(a)(1) (2020) (prohibiting employers from demanding 
doctor’s certifications for leave of less than three days).
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agency is disorganized, slow, and uncommunicative. DOES repeat-
edly lost evidence, like Olivia’s paystubs and offer letter, forcing 
her to re-submit information. Her claims examiner often ignored 
her emails and phone calls, confused the details of her claim, and 
refused to provide her with a copy of her own complaint. It took 
two and a half months for DOES to even send notice of Olivia’s
wage claim to Arbalis and another month before the agency in-
formed Olivia that it would be holding a factfinding and mediation 
conference. That conference, however, never got scheduled.
“It is getting ridiculous,” Olivia said after several months. “[I am] 
really confused about why it is taking [DOES] so long to take every 
small step.”7 After nine months, there had been no substantive 
movement on her claim. As far as she could tell, the agency had 
not collected any additional evidence, made any findings, or taken 
any meaningful action.8 Olivia gave up on the government. With 
the help of a pro bono attorney, she settled her claim with Arbalis.
Although she did not recover the damages and penalties she was 
entitled to, she was happy to just have the experience behind her.9
* * *
Cora, Earl, and Olivia work in vastly different industries, have di-
vergent skillsets, and run the gamut in age, background, and edu-
cation. But, as with so many working people, the common thread 
that ties together the tapestry of their experiences is wage theft.
Wage theft occurs when an employer denies a worker the wages 
or benefits to which they are entitled.10 While wage theft affects 
workers of all backgrounds and in every industry, low-wage work-
ers—and especially women, people of color, immigrants, and those 
with little formal education—are more susceptible to abuse than 
others.11 Common forms of wage theft include not paying the min-
imum wage, denying overtime, misclassifying employees as inde-
pendent contractors, and paying workers less than promised.12 At 
best, wage theft reflects a lack of knowledge about the basic man-
dates of employment law; at worst, it is a casual and callous repudi-
ation of the minimum workplace standards that society has 




10. KIM BOBO, WAGE THEFT IN AMERICA: WHY MILLIONS OF WORKING AMERICANS ARE 
NOT GETTING PAID—AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 7 (2009).
11. DAVID COOPER & TERESA KROEGER, ECON. POL’Y INST., EMPLOYERS STEAL BILLIONS 
FROM WORKERS’ PAYCHECKS EACH YEAR 8, 20 (2017).
12. Matthew Fritz-Mauer, Lofty Laws, Broken Promises: Wage Theft and the Degradation of 
Low-Wage Workers, 20 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 71, 72–73 (2016).
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deemed necessary. In every instance, it is an unlawful and unac-
ceptable denial of civil rights.
Over the past fifteen years, researchers, activists, commentators, 
and politicians have paid a significant amount of attention to this 
problem. The picture that emerges is stark. Wage theft is pervasive 
and highly impactful. Its most frequent victims are the working 
poor,13 who simultaneously need the money the most and are the 
least able to enforce their rights.14 It reduces personal incomes by 
thousands of dollars per year and collectively costs low-wage work-
ers billions in unpaid earnings.15
Wage theft’s harms reverberate beyond the individuals who ex-
perience it, depriving families, neighborhoods, and entire com-
munities of a shocking amount of money. In doing so, it perpetu-
ates the vicious cycle of poverty, dragging hundreds of thousands 
of families below the poverty line despite their hard work.16 The 
consequences are significant. Wage theft inflames a range of social 
problems, as poverty is linked with shorter lifespans,17 poor 
health,18 eviction,19 and unsafe neighborhoods.20 Over time, wage 
theft creates a direct barrier to generational economic advance-
ment.
But the harms of wage theft are far more than economic. For 
people living on the economic margins of society, who depend on 
every dollar in every paycheck just to make ends meet, wage theft 
presents a distinct threat to their way of being. Even being denied 
a hundred dollars can put a person on the wrong side of hunger, 
homelessness, and despair. Beyond that, low-wage workers are 
largely aware of their own mistreatment and frequently experience 
anger, frustration, and depression because of wage theft. In other 
words, Cora, Earl, and Olivia’s stories are not especially egregious, 
offensive, or uncommon examples of what America’s low-wage 
13. See ANNETTE BERNHARDT, RUTH MILKMAN, NIK THEODORE, DOUGLAS HACKATHORN,
MIRABAI AUER, JAMES DEFILIPPIS, ANA LUZ GONZÁLEZ, VICTOR NARRO, JASON PERELSHTEYN,
DIANA POLSON & MARTIN SPILLER, BROKEN LAWS, UNPROTECTED WORKERS: VIOLATIONS OF 
EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAWS IN AMERICA’S CITIES (2009); COOPER & KROEGER, supra note 
11, at 8.
14. Fritz-Mauer, supra note 12, at 102–05.
15. BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 13, at 5–6; COOPER & KROEGER, supra note 11, at 1.
16. COOPER & KROEGER, supra note 11, at 13–14.
17. Raj Chetty, Michael Stepner, Sarah Abraham, Shelby Lin, Benjamin Scuderi, 
Nicholas Turner, Augustin Bergeron, & David Cutler, The Association Between Income and Life 
Expectancy in the United States, 2001-2014, 315 JAMA 1750, 1750 (2016); see also Christopher 
Mansfield & Lloyd F. Novick, Poverty and Health, 73 N.C. MED. J. 366, 367 (2012).
18. Mansfield & Novick, supra note 17, at 366.
19. MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED: POVERTY AND PROFIT IN THE AMERICAN CITY (2015).
20. Travis C. Pratt & Francis T. Cullen, Assessing Macro-Level Predictors and Theories of 
Crime: A Meta-Analysis, 32 CRIME & JUST. 373, 406 (2005).
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workers experience, but the opposite: Their stories are all too typi-
cal.
This increased attention to wage theft has not fallen on deaf 
ears. Recently, states and cities have broadly reformed their laws in 
response to emerging research and social pressure.21 These legal 
reforms commonly enhance civil and criminal penalties for wage 
theft, incentivize action by the private bar, expand the enforce-
ment capabilities of government agencies, impose reporting re-
quirements on employers, and provide new avenues for relief.22
These changes have been inspiring, timely, and important.
But the central thesis of this Article is that responses to wage 
theft, including the actions taken by some of the most progressive 
jurisdictions, are fundamentally inadequate. In both passage and 
implementation, anti-wage theft policies are broadly predicated on 
a misunderstanding of what wage theft is and how it works. The 
remedies we create and the ways we administer them are centered 
on the idea that wage theft is a personal problem that can be ade-
quately addressed through laws and processes that encourage indi-
viduals to take action. It is not, and it cannot be.
This Article argues that wage theft is a social problem that cannot 
be meaningfully remedied through an enforcement scheme that 
emphasizes private causes of action and passive, complaint-based 
administrative processes. Until policymakers understand that wage 
theft is a widespread public problem that not only deserves but re-
quires a broad, proactive social response, low-wage workers will con-
tinue to have their most basic rights violated—frequently, flagrant-
ly, and to great harm.
This Article explores the problem of wage theft by tracing its 
contours, discussing existing solutions, and explaining the failures 
of these approaches. Part I defines wage theft and summarizes its 
scope and severity. In doing so, I rely on both existing quantitative 
research and my own in-depth analysis of wage theft among low-
wage workers in the District of Columbia (D.C.). In the wake of 
D.C.’s own sweeping statutory reforms, I conducted approximately 
60 semi-structured interviews with low-wage workers, workers’
rights activists, employment lawyers, and a small number of em-
ployers and government actors. This research provides texture to 
the economic realities of wage theft and, for the first time, explores 
21. See Marc Doussard & Ahmad Gamal, The Rise of Wage Theft Laws: Can Community–
Labor Coalitions Win Victories in State Houses?, 52 URB. AFFS. REV. 780, 780 (2016); Daniel J. 
Galvin, Deterring Wage Theft: Alt-Labor, State Politics, and the Policy Determinants of Minimum 
Wage Compliance, 14 PERSP., ON POL. 324, 324 (2016).
22. See Galvin, supra note 21 at 325; D.C. CODE §§ 32-1308, 32-1308.01 (2017).
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the personal and social consequences of basic workplace rights vio-
lations.
Part II summarizes how we think about and have responded to 
this social problem. We conceive of wage theft as a civil offense, a 
personal issue that should be dealt with on an individual, case-by-
case basis, much like a dispute over a car accident or a contract. 
Both the laws designed to combat wage theft and the actual ap-
proach of government actors reflect this thinking. Legal reforms 
emphasize private action and individual empowerment, while gov-
ernment agencies have overwhelmingly adopted a passive, lenient,
complaint-based approach to workplace standards enforcement.
Part III explores why current legal reforms and enforcement 
strategies are failing. Statutory changes are crucially important. 
Standing alone, however, existing countermeasures are inade-
quate. They are premised on the idea that individual empower-
ment can present a meaningful response to this social problem, 
but this misses the key fact: the vast majority of low-wage workers 
who suffer wage theft will never take formal action, so a plan that 
overwhelmingly relies on expanding private causes of action is des-
tined to fail. As my research from D.C. shows, even with robust 
laws, wage theft still plagues working people.
Finally, Part IV provides a summary of best practices regarding 
wage theft. Because this issue is a complex and widespread public 
problem, it requires a strategic, thoughtful, and multifaceted social 
response. The final section details the requirements of an effective 
enforcement scheme, explaining why this approach is necessary.
I. THE SOCIAL HARM OF WAGE THEFT
We typically think about wage theft as a problem that is properly 
addressed on an individual basis. To that end, reforms—both as 
written and applied—largely focus on empowering aggrieved 
workers to bring legal claims and collect unpaid wages and penal-
ties.23
This section directly challenges this underlying premise through 
a review of the practical realities of wage theft. It is not a personal 
issue. It is—and must be treated as—a social problem because wage 
theft is pervasive and highly impactful. It costs affected workers 
thousands of dollars per year,24 undermining society’s most basic 
workplace protections. Its harms are not purely economic, howev-
23. See Galvin, supra note 21, at 325 (discussing various anti-wage theft interventions).
24. BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 13, at 5; COOPER & KROEGER, supra note 11, at 1.
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er. Frequently, its victims experience devastating cascading harms, 
including hunger, homelessness, lasting anger, and deep depres-
sion. Even beyond these personal impacts, wage theft broadly hurts 
society, siphoning billions from low-income communities and 
trapping families in the vicious cycle of poverty.25 It also denies bil-
lions in revenue to the government.26 Finally, wage theft harms 
employers, distorting the labor market and depriving honest busi-
nesses of the opportunity to fairly compete.
A. The Economic Costs of Wage Theft
A wealth of quantitative research paints a clear picture: viola-
tions of bedrock employment laws are part and parcel of America’s
capitalist economic landscape and cost people and society an ex-
traordinary amount of money.
1.  Minimum Wage Violations
Minimum wage violations are significant in both size and scope. 
Utilizing broad surveys and large-scale data sets from the Census 
Bureau, researchers estimate that roughly seventeen to 26% of low-
wage workers experience minimum wage violations each year.27
These abuses are generally significant to individuals and low-wage 
workers. A 2009 survey of almost 4,400 low-income people in Los 
Angeles, Chicago, and New York City found that almost 60% of 
those who experienced minimum wage violations were underpaid 
by more than $1 per hour.28 Analyses of Census Bureau data esti-
mate that minimum wage violations cost affected workers about 
one-quarter of their earnings.29 In real dollars-and-cents terms, the 
average affected low-income person who works year round has 
about $3,300 stolen per year, reducing their take-home earnings to 
only about $10,500.30 These costs add up; collectively, low-wage 
25. See COOPER & KROEGER, supra note 11, at 1.
26. FRANÇOISE CARRE, ECON. POL’Y INST., (IN)DEPENDENT CONTRACTOR 
MISCLASSIFICATION 2 (2015).
27. See BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 13, at 2 (26% of workers in their sample); COOPER 
& KROEGER, supra note 11, at 1 (estimate of 17% of workers); Galvin, supra note 21, at 330 
(estimating 16.9% of workers).
28. BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 13, at 2.
29. Galvin, supra note 21, at 331 (finding that minimum wage violations cost affected 
workers twenty-three percent of their income, and noting that this is “toward the lower end 
of other published estimates”); COOPER & KROEGER, supra note 11, at 36 (noting overall 
losses of 23.9% of earned wages).
30. COOPER & KROEGER, supra note 11, at 2.
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workers are estimated to lose $15 billion per year to minimum 
wage violations alone, artificially placing hundreds of thousands of 
families below the federal poverty line.31
2.  Independent Contractor Misclassification
Independent contractor misclassification is one of the most 
common and damaging kinds of wage theft. Misclassification oc-
curs in every sector, but it is particularly flagrant where it will be 
most profitable, like the construction industry,32 and where the 
work is relatively isolated, like the cleaning and trucking indus-
tries.33
Nearly all workers in the United States fall into two categories: 
employees and independent contractors. Generally speaking, em-
ployees labor for a single employer who exercises control over 
them.34 The true independent contractor, on the other hand, is 
someone with a particular skill who runs their own business, enjoys 
considerable autonomy, and has a number of clients.35 Independ-
ent contractors, then, do not depend on one particular entity for 
their wages, nor are they closely directed and controlled by their 
employers. Here is a classic example: servers at a restaurant are 
employees, but a plumber who fixes a leaky pipe at the restaurant 
is an independent contractor. There is no ongoing relationship, 
the restaurant does not control the plumber’s work, and the 
plumber has expertise.36
It is almost always more beneficial to be classified as an employ-
ee. Employees are protected by wage and hour laws, have the right 
to form unions, enjoy access to workers’ compensation and unem-
ployment insurance, and pay fewer taxes on their earnings.37 Busi-
nesses, in turn, are required to pay a variety of taxes for each of 
their employees, including Social Security, Medicare, and unem-
31. Id. at 2–3.
32. The construction industry, for example, has high workers’ compensation premi-
ums, but contractors are able to reduce their costs by as much as 30% percent through mis-
classification. CARRÉ, supra note 26, at 2.
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., WAGE & HOUR DIV., FACT SHEET 13: AM I AN EMPLOYEE?:
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (FLSA) (2014) (discuss-
ing differences between independent contractors and employees).
35. Id.
36. Courts also like to use this example. Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Ct.,
416 P.3d 1, 37 (Cal. 2018) (describing a retail store hiring an outside plumber or an outside 
electrician as an example of independent contracting).
37. Fritz-Mauer, supra note 12, at 93–94.
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ployment insurance.38 Additionally, anti-discrimination laws only 
cover employees.39
Businesses often wrongly label their employees as independent 
contractors to save money on labor costs. Studies repeatedly find 
that at least eleven to 30% of businesses misclassify at least one 
worker.40 Overall, there may be several million misclassified work-
ers nationally.41
Misclassification is also called payroll fraud because, often, the 
point is to lie to the government to avoid taxes.42 These taxes in-
clude contributions to the crucial programs that form the social 
safety net. Every year, as workers are paid off the books or misclas-
sified, billions of dollars of payroll are never reported to the gov-
ernment.43 The cost to society is enormous, “robbing unemploy-
ment insurance and workers’ compensation funds of billions.”44
And when wrongly-classified workers do attempt to take advantage 
of these entitlements—as many eventually do—they are either de-
nied the benefits or else society is forced to absorb the costs.
3.  Overtime, Time Shaving, Illegal Deductions, and Tip Stealing
Research on other kinds of wage theft has been much more lim-
ited. There are no studies evaluating the rates at which employers 
unlawfully deny their employees access to workers’ compensation, 
unemployment, and guaranteed sick leave. Nor have there been 
studies examining how often employers misclassify their workers as 
exempt from minimum wage and overtime protections. For many 
kinds of wage theft, the landmark survey of 4,400 low-wage workers 
discussed above provides the best—and only—information we have 
on violation rates. Those findings are summarized in Table 1.1.45
38. CARRÉ, supra note 26, at 1–2.
39. Coverage, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/employers
/coverage.cfm [https://perma.cc/P5YY-GW4B].
40. CARRÉ, supra note 26, at 9.
41. CATHERINE RUCKELSHAUS & CEILIDH GAO, NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT, INDEPENDENT 
CONTRACTOR MISCLASSIFICATION IMPOSES HUGE COSTS ON WORKERS AND FEDERAL AND 
STATE TREASURIES 2 (2017).
42. See MARK ERLICH & TERRY GERSTEIN, CONFRONTING MISCLASSIFICATION AND
PAYROLL FRAUD: A SURVEY OF STATE LABOR STANDARDS ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 5 (2019).
43. RUCKELSHAUS & GAO, supra note 41, at 7.
44. Id. at 1.
45. BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 13, at 2–3.
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TABLE 1.1: FINDINGS ON OTHER FORMS OF WAGE THEFT
* among eligible workers in the week prior to 
being surveyed.
B. The Personal Costs of Wage Theft
The overwhelming majority of wage theft research has been 
quantitative. As discussed, researchers tend to use large data sets to 
analyze and estimate the trends and economic consequences of 
various types of wage theft. Although incredibly useful, this body of 
research is missing a strong representation of the viewpoints and 
experiences of low-wage workers themselves. While the raw statis-
tics are damning, they do not fully describe the texture of the eco-
nomic and social hardships caused by wage theft.
Over the course of eighteen months, I conducted an in-depth, 
qualitative study on wage theft. I focused on wage theft among low-
wage workers in the District in the wake of the city passing one of 
the most robust and progressive anti-wage theft laws in the coun-
try.46 One key finding is that wage theft imposes significant person-
al costs on those who experience it, and these costs are of great 
concern. To reiterate, I interviewed approximately 60 people. Most 
were low-wage workers (n=33), but I also spoke with policy stake-
holders, including workers’ rights activists (n=12), employment 
lawyers (n=10), and a small number of employers and government 
actors. The takeaway is this: wage theft causes significant harm that 
goes beyond the dollars-and-cents of it all and is rarely something 
that can simply be absorbed or ignored.
1. Cascading Economic Harms
To grasp the full range of economic harm caused by wage theft, 
it is necessary to understand the crime in context. For the low-wage 
workers who experience it, wage theft is about more than just an 
immediate loss of money. Low-wage workers do not have signifi-
46. See Wage Theft Prevention Amendment Act, 20 D.C. Stat. 4458 (2014) (codified as 
D.C. Code § 20-157 (2015)).
Form of Wage Theft Violation Rate*
Failure to pay overtime 76%
Unpaid off-the clock work 70%
Illegal deductions 41%
Tip stealing 12%
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cant savings to fall back on.47 Most live paycheck to paycheck, mak-
ing for a tenuous existence, and there is a thin, blurry line between 
survival and tragedy.
Being denied payment often cascades into other escalating 
harms. If wages are late, short, or entirely unpaid, the whole fragile 
scheme holding together a person’s life can be put in jeopardy. 
This is because the real experience of being poor does not come 
from just one aspect of poverty, like bad housing, food insecurity, 
or a lack of healthcare. The essence of poverty lies in how a per-
son’s hardships coalesce, interact, and build upon one another.48 It 
is this interaction that defines the lives of the working poor, and 
the danger of wage theft’s overflowing harms is what threatens the 
delicate balance of a person’s existence. When the money workers 
expect and need suddenly is not there, they are forced to navigate 
a maze of hard choices. Making it through becomes a question of 
strategy. Who to call? Who to borrow money from? What is the best 
approach to take with utility companies, the phone company, and 
the landlord? Does rent get prioritized? Heat? Food?
Jonathan Tucker, a DC-area employment lawyer who primarily 
represents underpaid immigrants, knows well the problems that his 
clients suffer:
[T]he fundamental issue that we’re dealing with, wage 
theft, is if people were just paid the wages that they work
[and] that they earn, well, you no longer have a failure to 
pay rent, which is what I was dealing with [when I worked] 
at Legal Aid. You no longer have credit card debt collec-
tion, which is what I was dealing with at Legal Aid, or a 
foreclosure case. . . . All these other problems that are gen-
erated by a failure to pay wages are resolved.49
According to Jonathan, wage theft lawsuits are “a way to attack the 
cancer” at the heart of misfortune.50
47. This statement is self-obvious, since poor people by definition do not have signifi-
cant assets. In addition, a 2018 survey by the Federal Reserve found that almost 40% of 
adults in this country would not have the money to pay for a hypothetical $400 emergency. 
BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING OF U.S.
HOUSEHOLDS IN 2018 2 (2019).
48. See generally DESMOND, supra note 19; DAVID K. SHIPLER, THE WORKING POOR:
INVISIBLE IN AMERICA 11 (2005) (“Isolating the individual problems [of poverty], as a labora-
tory would extract specific toxins, would be artificial and pointless. They exist largely be-
cause of one another, and the chemical reaction among them worsens the overall effect.”).
49. Interview with Jonathan Tucker, Att’y, DCWageLaw, in Washington, D.C. (2018) 
(transcript on file with author).
50. Id.
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As Jonathan knows, low-wage workers struggle to meet their 
most basic needs when they are not paid properly. Harriet, for ex-
ample, is a DC government employee who has an acrimonious re-
lationship with her supervisor.51 On two occasions, the agency she 
works for held up her paycheck without explanation, which Har-
riet blames on her supervisor’s animosity.52 Once, she went unpaid 
for several weeks. “I had to make arrangements with the rent,” she 
says, her frustration apparent. “[My landlady] was getting tired, be-
cause nobody wants to hear that your job is holding your pay. 
You’re a government employee! They don’t believe that! So I had 
to show proof, you know, that I’ve been begging for money [from 
my employer].”53
This is a common theme. Workers frequently tell of managing 
their wage theft by borrowing money to pay for necessities. Often, 
they must choose among those necessities, picking between rent 
and food, utilities and transportation. Some things are easier to cut 
out, like trips to the movies or new clothes. It is far more difficult 
to choose among the basic and common requirements of modern 
life.
The more severe or chronic the wage theft, the harder it be-
comes to balance competing obligations. For many, trouble even-
tually strikes in the form of an unanticipated hardship. While 
Ameen was struggling to get his former employer to pay him his 
earned wages, for example, he got sick and had to go to the emer-
gency room.54 This is an expensive stopgap at best, and cost him 
about $1,500.55 Manageable if he had been paid the more than 
$40,000 his former employer owed him.56 Unmanageable because 
he had not. His car was repossessed, and when we met, he was be-
ing evicted.57
Eviction is a looming threat in the lives of the working poor, and 
researchers increasingly recognize it as a significant social prob-
lem. In Evicted: Poverty and Profit in the American City, sociologist 
Matthew Desmond reveals the stark ways in which eviction is both a 
consequence and a driver of poverty.58 Poor people struggle with 
bills and face homelessness as a result. This threat of homelessness, 
51. Telephone Interview with Harriet, Admin. Assistant, D.C. Mun. Gov’t (2018) (tran-
script on file with author).
52. Id.
53. Id.





58. DESMOND, supra note 19, at 295–303
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in turn, leads to a slew of negative outcomes, including joblessness, 
hunger, trauma, and unstable communities.59 When working peo-
ple are denied their earned wages, the threat of eviction—among 
others—looms larger and larger over time. Many people, like 
Ameen, quickly face homelessness after falling behind.60 Others are 
lucky enough to have charitable or understanding landlords, but 
patience runs thin over time. Beyond that, the reality of debt and 
the prospect of eviction is itself difficult. Carol, for example, is tens 
of thousands of dollars in debt to her landlord.61 “What judge do 
you think that won’t tell me to get out, and I won’t even give you
30 days?” she asks.62 Like many, the piling bills threaten to over-
whelm Carol, and as the next section explains, the strain of such 
circumstances is itself harmful.
2.  Mental Costs
Most wage theft research discusses its economic consequences. 
There are also significant human costs, however. Wage theft pre-
sents high economic stakes for the working poor, but it is also per-
sonally offensive and can lead to severe emotional and psychologi-
cal strain.
This is not true for every low-wage worker. But those who do not 
express strong negative feelings about their wage theft are typically 
unaware of their rights violations. Ashna and Sabbir, for example, 
did not know that their former employers had illegally denied 
them overtime, thinking instead that this practice simply reflected 
a lawful business decision.63 But stories like this present the excep-
tion to the rule. Most workers are generally aware, or at some point 
become aware, of their own mistreatment,64 and their feelings of 
injustice combined with the stress of wage theft’s cascading eco-
nomic harms elicits powerful reactions.
59. Id.
60. Interview with Ameen, supra note 54.
61. Interview with Carol, Unemployed, in Washington, D.C. (2018) (transcript on file 
with author).
62. Id.
63. Interview with Ashna, Low-wage Worker, in Washington, D.C. (2018) (transcript on 
file with author); Telephone Interview with Sabbir, House Cleaner (2018) (transcript on file 
with author).
64. This is something of a contested point. Research reveals that low-income people—
and Americans in general—do not have a strong understanding of what their rights are. 
E.g., Charlotte Alexander & Arthi Prasad, Bottom-Up Workplace Law Enforcement, 89 IND. L.J.
1069, 1093–95 (2014); Pauline T. Kim, Norms, Learning, and Law: Exploring the Influences on 
Workers’ Legal Knowledge, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 447, 506 (1999). But, broadly speaking, I found 
that most eventually do become aware of their rights violations, as discussed in more detail 
infra Section III.B.
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Low-wage workers frequently express anger, frustration, and de-
pression over their wage theft. These feelings are understandable. 
The situation is defined by their illegal exploitation, directly harms 
their financial security, and offers few opportunities for redress. 
Miranda, for example, worked for a large department store that 
frequently shaved time off of her paycheck.65 She began to track 
her hours, and each time she confronted her supervisors, the store 
admitted its fault and paid her at least some of her money.66 But 
the delay carried costs, and the act itself deeply offended her. 
“[There] was one time that my lights almost got turned out,” she 
says, clearly frustrated. “I would have to borrow money to pay my 
gas or my electric bill, you know, because [my employer] was mess-
ing up! And I told them that, you know? I’ve earned this!”67
These expressions of anger are common. “It used to be a saying 
about work, how people go postal,” says Kira, who consistently 
fights to have her employer follow D.C.’s paid sick days law. “I
clearly now understand that meaning . . . .”68 Kira is not going to 
actually attack people, but she is describing the intense frustration 
that many feel as a result of having to address pay-related incon-
sistencies and aggravations that, in their mind, should both not ex-
ist and be easily resolved.
These feelings do not just flow from a loss of money. The princi-
ple matters. “I’ve been cheated for a long time,” says Will, who dis-
covered that for years his employer had been paying him less than 
he had been promised.69 “His refusal to pay has even made it 
worse, knowing that he’s wrong. . . . I think I’m more upset be-
cause of his refusal to honor what he’s owed.”70 Others echo Will’s
thoughts. Being paid late “makes you feel degraded, like you’re 
useless,” Harriet says.71 “Worthless,” agrees Cora.72
As these conversations suggest, many also express a deep sadness 
when talking about their experiences with wage theft. Just under 
half of the workers I interviewed (16 of 33) expressed feeling de-
pressed, embarrassed, or ashamed over the violations of their
workplace rights, including both their treatment by employers and 
their perceived and practical inability to do anything about it. It 
65. Interview with Miranda, Dep’t Store Emp., in Washington, D.C. (2018) (transcript 
on file with author).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Interview with Kira, Dep’t Store Emp., in Washington, D.C. (2018) (transcript on 
file with author).
69. Interview with Will, Pool Manager, in Oxon Hill, Md. (2018) (transcript on file with 
author).
70. Id.
71. Telephone Interview with Harriet, supra note 51.
72. Interview with Cora, supra note 2.
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was upsetting for these people to have to grapple with the reality 
that they were being wronged and that there was no easy, clear, or 
reliable path to justice.
Wrapped up in work is pride, a sense that a person is a part of 
the broader American economic landscape, capable of supporting 
themselves and the ones they love. When this is suddenly not the 
case, and when it is because of another person’s unlawful acts, the 
experience can be deeply upsetting. Caleb’s former employer, for 
instance, underpaid him for more than four years, often drastically 
so.73 Conservatively, his employer owes him tens of thousands of 
dollars. Because of this, he lives with his sister and cannot afford to 
buy birthday presents for his grandchildren. “I don’t feel [like] a
man,” he says. “I ain’t a grandfather!”74
The consequences of wage theft can spiral out of control, as the 
confluence of economic insecurity and mental distress drive some 
to contemplate suicide. The combined strain of these factors helps 
explain why suicide is linked to poverty and periods of economic 
hardship,75 and why raising the minimum wage reduces suicide 
rates.76 Recall Cora, whose story began this Article. She attempted 
to kill herself, and only, at the last moment, diverted from that
path and entered into therapy.77 Like Cora, James—a grocery store 
worker—is also in therapy. “I get at the point where I want to kill 
myself sometimes, you know?” he says. “It’s really rough. It’s al-
ready hard enough, and to have to fight just to get the money 
[] . . . it’s rough.”78
Harriet did not herself attempt suicide, but her father did. He is 
sick and moved in with her when her mother died. “My father was 
getting depressed because he was worried about me getting fired,
and it was just a mess,” she says. She speaks quickly, clipping her 
words with anger. “He would try to commit suicide . . . . [H]e was 
trying to take pills so he wouldn’t be a burden.”79
Although this study has been the first to deeply explore the per-
sonal and social consequences of wage theft, these conclusions find 
support in others’ research. In studying how well Californians are 
73. Interview with Caleb, Unemployed, in Md. (2018) (transcript on file with author).
74. Id.
75. See generally David C. Purselle, Michael Heninger, Randy Hanzlick & Steven J. Gar-
low, Differential Association of Socioeconomic Status in Ethnic and Age-defined Suicides, 167 
PSYCHIATRY RES. 258, 262 (2009).
76. See generally John A. Kaufman, Leslie K. Salas-Hernández, Kelli A. Komro & Melvin 
D. Livingston, Effects of Increased Minimum Wages by Unemployment Rate on Suicide in the USA, 74 
J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & CMTY. HEALTH 219, 221 (2020).
77. Interview with Cora, supra note 2.
78. Telephone Interview with James, Grocery Store Clerk, in Washington, D.C. (2018) 
(transcript on file with author).
79. Telephone Interview with Harriet, supra note 51.
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able to collect on their favorable wage judgments, researchers in-
terviewed low-wage workers who had experienced wage theft and 
attempted to assert their rights.80 They reported feeling frustrated, 
angry, and depressed over their treatment, the material hardships 
caused by wage theft, and the inefficacy of the legal system. One 
explained that “[t]here were even days where I had nothing to eat, 
and I had to go look for donations to find food for my family,”
which “made me feel very depressed.”81 Another said she “felt upset 
and powerless not to collect” the money she earned.82
In short, although wage theft research has tended to focus on 
monetary costs, it also threatens its victims with significant emo-
tional trauma, both because it causes cascading economic conse-
quences and because many of its victims find it personally offen-
sive.
3.  Health Consequences
Wage theft also contributes to poor physical health by exacerbat-
ing poverty, which has long been linked to negative health out-
comes.83 Researchers estimate that minimum wage violations alone 
artificially force hundreds of thousands of people into poverty.84
Even those victims who do not technically fall below the poverty 
line suffer a loss to their economic well-being.
Less money leads to a harder life. Poor people, adults and chil-
dren alike, are more likely to experience a variety of chronic 
health conditions, including diabetes, heart disease, obesity, stress, 
headaches, and ear infections.85 Because most of those without 
health insurance are poor or near-poor, they are also far less likely 
to seek treatment.86
80. EUNICE HYUNHYE CHO, TIA KOONSE & ANTHONY MISCHEL, NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT,
HOLLOW VICTORIES: THE CRISIS IN COLLECTING UNPAID WAGES FOR CALIFORNIA’S WORKERS
1–2 (2013).
81. Id. at 4.
82. Id.
83. Mansfield & Novick, supra note 17.
84. COOPER & KROEGER, supra note 11, at 2, 13–14
85. See Mansfield & Novick, supra note 17, at 366–70; see also Claire Conway, Poor Health: 
When Poverty Becomes Disease, U.C.S.F.: NEWS & MEDIA (Jan. 6, 2016), 
https://www.ucsf.edu/news/2016/01/401251/poor-health-when-poverty-becomes-disease
[https://perma.cc/89EW-4K46].
86. JENNIFER TOLBERT, KENDAL ORGERA & ANTHONY DAMICO, KEY FACTS ABOUT THE 
UNINSURED POPULATION, KAISER FAM. FOUND.: UNINSURED (Dec. 13, 2019), https://www.
kff.org/uninsured/issue-brief/key-facts-about-the-uninsured-population [https://perma.cc
/6VCY-VTNK].
SPRING 2021] Wage Theft 755
Like eviction and wage theft, poor health both derives from and 
worsens poverty. Low-income people live in substandard housing,87
are exposed to more pollution, have less access to healthy food, 
and tend to live more sedentary lifestyles because fewer safe recrea-
tional activities are available.88 Poor neighborhoods experience 
more violent crime,89 which has devastating long-term effects. 
Children who grow up in violent communities have lower grades, 
less interest in school, and do poorly on standardized tests.90 They 
simply do not have the same opportunities to flourish, grow, and 
succeed.
These consequences add up and create stark outcomes. On av-
erage, “[i]mpoverished adults live seven to eight years less than 
those who have incomes four or more times the federal poverty 
level.”91 Put simply, the chronic and costly nature of wage theft ex-
acerbates the vicious cycle of poverty, imposing severe costs not just 
on immediate victims, but also on their family members, neigh-
bors, and communities.
C. Economic Costs Revisited: Wage Theft, Market Distortion, and 
High-Road Employers
Finally, one other group suffers as a result of wage theft: honest
employers. Although the issue is often cast in terms of workers ver-
sus employers, this is a limited way to think about it. The fact is, 
many people genuinely seek to run law-abiding businesses. But 
when they are forced to compete in industries where wage theft is 
rampant, the struggle of starting and managing a business becomes
that much more difficult as they find themselves undercut by their 
unscrupulous competitors. In many industries, the corrupted na-
ture of the market itself creates a powerful incentive to violate the 
law.
Aaron Seyedian is one such legitimate employer. He owns Well-
Paid Maids, a cleaning service in the D.C. and Boston metropolitan 
87. See DESMOND, supra note 19.
88. Mansfield & Novick, supra note 17, at 366–67.
89. ROBERT J. SAMPSON, GREAT AMERICAN CITY: CHICAGO AND THE ENDURING 
NEIGHBORHOOD EFFECT 143–48 (2012).
90. Larissa A. Borofsky, Ilana Kellerman, Brian Baucom, Pamella H. Oliver & Gayla 
Margolin, Community Violence Exposure and Adolescents’ School Engagement and Academic 
Achievement Over Time, 3 PSYCH. VIOLENCE 381, 390–91 (2013); Adam J. Milam, C. Debra Full-
Holden & Philip J. Leaf, Perceived School and Neighborhood Safety, Neighborhood Violence and Aca-
demic Achievement in Urban School Children, 42 URB. REV. 458, 463–65 (2010).
91. Conway, supra note 85. When Conway wrote this article, the federal poverty line was 
$11,770 for a single person. Id.
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areas.92 Well-Paid Maids is an anomaly in the home cleaning busi-
ness, which features high wage theft rates.93 Aaron’s employees 
earn $17 an hour, have health care, get 22 paid days off per year, 
and have 100% employer-paid short-term disability leave, among 
other benefits.94
“Most of my competitors lack valid business licenses, do not pay 
sales tax, and misclassify workers,” Aaron says.95 These illegal prac-
tices are very profitable. “Typical margins for a 1099 company in 
the cleaning industry [are] 40, 45%,” Aaron explains.96 “Our profit 
margin[] oscillates month-to-month. . . . [B]asically, on paper it’s
20%. After emergencies and crises are added in, it’s around 16 or 
17%.”97 That is a stunning difference, to say the least. The only rea-
son Aaron has been able to make it work is because he did not take 
a salary for the first year he was in business and because he oper-
ates only in places where there are enough affluent, social-justice 
minded people willing to pay his significantly higher rates.98 “[I]f
you book a weekly cleaning with some other service in D.C., you 
can very easily get your one bedroom, one bathroom clean for like 
$89 each time,” he says.99 “Whereas from us, it’s going to cost $149 
or $139, depending on what time you book, right? So, people see 
that and they balk. Not all people, but a substantial contingent of 
people, and it’s because they’re used to prices that are set by illegal 
practices. . . [.]”100
There is an important takeaway here. Wage theft is widespread, 
its victims are rarely able to find vindication,101 and government en-
forcement is uncommon and inadequate.102 For employers like Aa-
ron Seyedian, wage theft distorts the competitive market. In many 
industries, legal guarantees for workers have become liabilities for 
employers who wish to be decent but are torn between the moral 
imperative of following basic workplace laws and the realities of 
running a business.
92. Interview with Aaron Seyedian, Owner, Well-Paid Maids, in Washington, D.C. 
(2018) (transcript on file with author).
93. See CARRÉ, supra note 26, at 2 (noting misclassification is especially prevalent in 
housecleaning); BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 13, at 31 (finding 29.5% of maids and house-
keepers were paid less than minimum wage the week prior).
94. Interview with Aaron Seyedian, supra note 92.
95. Email from Aaron Seyedian to author (Apr. 19, 2018) (on file with author).





101. See, e.g., CHO ET AL., supra note 80, at 1–3; Alexander & Prasad, supra note 64, at 
1098.
102. See Janice Fine, Enforcing Labor Standards in Partnership with Civil Society: Can Co-
Enforcement Succeed Where the State Alone Has Failed?, 45 POL. & SOC’Y 359, 360–61 (2017).
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The research presented here illustrates the central thesis of this 
Article: wage theft is not an individualized issue, but one that causes 
broad and lasting harm to society generally. Violations of our na-
tion’s bedrock employment laws are common and cause significant 
financial and emotional harm to workers, high-road employers, 
and labor markets in general.
Because wage theft is a broad, multi-faceted social problem, ef-
fectively attacking it requires a concerted, social approach. As dis-
cussed in the next Part, however, legal interventions generally do 
not reflect this idea. Rather than focus on public-driven systemic 
change, popular reforms instead attempt to empower individuals.
II. WAGE THEFT REFORMS AND ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES
Over the last fifteen years, activists and workers have mobilized 
to demand action from elected officials.103 Because of partisan di-
vides and powerful special interests, federal workplace protections 
such as the Fair Labor Standards Act and National Labor Relations 
Act have atrophied through congressional inaction.104 Consequent-
ly, reformers have turned their energy to state legislatures and 
courthouses. In many ways, they have been extremely successful. 
States and cities across the country have reformed and updated ex-
isting laws to better attack wage theft.
This Part provides an overview of these legal changes and their 
implementation. Reforms generally fall into four categories:
1. Laws broadening the definition of “employment”;
2. Laws enhancing civil and criminal penalties;
3. Laws creating or expanding causes of action and avenues 
for relief; and
4. Laws imposing more stringent recordkeeping require-
ments.
In both design and implementation, however, these reforms 
largely reflect the common misconception that wage theft is an in-
dividual problem that can and should be solved through personal 
empowerment and individual mobilization.
103. See Fritz-Mauer, supra note 12, at 123–26.
104. JACOB HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS 52–54 (2010).
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A. “Employment” Redefined
The first type of reform broadens the definition of “employ-
ment” to empower more people to invoke protective laws. As dis-
cussed in Part I, whether a person is classified as an employee or an 
independent contractor has an enormous impact on their legal sta-
tus. Independent contractors pay a higher tax rate and are explicit-
ly exempt from bedrock labor, employment, and anti-
discrimination laws,105 and cannot access key social safety net pro-
tections.106
Whether a worker is an employee or independent contractor 
depends on how a jurisdiction defines “employment.” Every juris-
diction has legal tests to analyze this issue. Adding to this confu-
sion, different statutes often have different tests.107
One way to address misclassification is to change the legal 
standard to more clearly include more workers under the umbrella 
of “employee.” In doing so, people gain both legal protections and 
the right to sue to enforce those rights.
Most tests analyzing whether a worker is an employee or inde-
pendent contractor evaluate a number of issues. Common factors 
include whether the worker is closely controlled, paid hourly, in a 
long-term relationship with the putative employer, and competes 
in the marketplace.108 These multi-factor tests can be confusing and 
difficult to apply. This creates a significant amount of uncertainty, 
and the grey area provides employers with broad opportunities to 
(mis)classify workers as independent contractors.
Lately, another test has become increasingly popular. In con-
trast to traditional analyses, the “ABC Test” is simple. It places the 
burden on the employer to prove that a worker is an independent 
contractor by showing that they:
A. are free from the employer’s control, both in writing and in 
fact;
B. perform work that is outside of the employer’s usual course 
of business; and
C. are engaged in an independently established business of 
their own.109
105. See supra Section I.A.2.
106. Id.
107. See, e.g., Independent Contractor Versus Employee, CAL. DEP’T INDUS. RELS.,
https://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/faq_independentcontractor.htm [https://perma.cc/TTW6-
MZL8] (discussing applicability of various tests).
108. E.g., U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., WAGE & HOUR DIV., supra note 34.
109. Rebecca Smith, Washington State Considers ABC Test for Employee Status, NAT’L EMP. L.
PROJECT (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.nelp.org/blog/washington-state-considers-abc-test-
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This test represents a significant shift. For example, under many 
analyses, Uber drivers are independent contractors.110 Under the 
ABC test, they are almost certainly employees.111 Because both gig 
work and franchising arrangements have become fixtures of the 
American economy,112 the ABC test has the potential to drastically 
change the nature of work in America.
While present in one form or another in many states,113 the ABC 
test shot to prominence in 2018 when the California Supreme 
Court adopted the test for wage and hour purposes.114 Then, in 
2019, California expanded on this decision by legislatively adopt-
ing the ABC test more broadly and applying it to the entire Labor 
Code with only a few exceptions.115 Given California’s status as both 
a progressive trendsetter116 and a large economy,117 this decision 
made waves. Other states are now considering adopting the ABC 
test in whole or in part,118 potentially re-classifying millions of peo-
ple.119
B. Enhancing Civil and Criminal Penalties
Perhaps the most popular type of reform enhances civil and 
criminal penalties for wage theft. This approach relies on the crim-
inological theory of deterrence, reasoning that harsher punish-
employee-status [https://perma.cc/S3L5-N6YS]; see also Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. 
Superior Ct., 416 P.3d 1, 7 (Cal. 2018).
110. E.g., Uber Technologies, Inc. Advice Memorandum from Jayme L. Sophir, Assoc. 
Gen. Couns., Div. of Advice, Off. of the Gen. Couns., NLRB, to Jill Coffman, Reg’l Dir., Re-
gion 20, NLRB, at 14 (Apr. 16, 2019), https://www.laborrelationsupdate.com/files
/2019/05/NLRB-Uber-memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/SZ7L-Y6J3]; U.S. Dep’t of Lab., Wage 
& Hour Div., Opinion Letter FLSA 2019-6 (Apr. 29, 2019).
111. Catherine L. Fisk, Those Gig Drivers Aren’t Independent Contractors – They’re Employees,
AM. PROSPECT (May 4, 2018), https://prospect.org/justice/gig-drivers-independent-
contractors-employees [https://perma.cc/998Z-KREY]. In the case of Uber drivers, the fact 
that the job they perform is the primary work of what Uber does is probably the key factor 
that makes them employees.
112. See generally DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE (2014).
113. Smith, supra note 109.
114. Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 1.
115. Alexia Fernández Campbell, California Just Passed a Landmark Law to Regulate Uber 
and Lyft, VOX (Sept. 18, 2019, 2:13 PM), https://www.vox.com/2019/9/11/20850878/
california-passes-ab5-bill-uber-lyft.
116. See Fritz-Mauer, supra note 12, at 76–94.
117. See California Now Has the World’s 5th Largest Economy, CBS NEWS (May 4, 2018, 6:40 
PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/california-now-has-the-worlds-5th-largest-economy/.
118. Smith, supra note 109.
119. In fact, in early 2020, the United States House of Representatives passed the PRO 
Act, which incorporates the ABC test into the National Labor Relations Act. Protecting the 
Right to Organize Act, H.R. 2474, 116th Cong. § 2(2) (2020).
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ments will result in fewer crimes.120 Jurisdictions frequently allow 
workers to recover significant damages on top of unpaid wages and 
empower the government to impose costly fines and penalties.121
Many places now also threaten criminal sanctions.122
There is good reason to support penalty enhancements. They 
compensate aggrieved workers for their added time and effort and 
can fund government anti-wage theft initiatives.123 Crucially, penal-
ty enhancements also reduce minimum wage violations. To evalu-
ate the efficacy of different kinds of anti-wage theft laws, political 
scientist Daniel Galvin used United States Census Bureau data to 
analyze minimum wage violations before and after legal reforms.124
He found that penalty enhancements do reduce violation rates; in 
particular, allowing workers to recover treble (triple) damages 
causes a meaningful and statistically significant reduction in mini-
mum wage violations.125 Other civil and criminal penalty enhance-
ments might also reduce wage theft, but the evidence is weaker.126
Crucially, it is not enough to just pass these laws. Actual en-
forcement matters. If the government signals to employers that it is 
not that interested in meaningfully punishing wage theft, then 
statutory protections lose much of their power. For example, after 
Ohio voters amended the state constitution to allow unpaid work-
ers to collect treble damages, minimum wage violation rates signif-
icantly declined.127 But when Ohio’s governor issued an executive 
order waiving imposition of these penalties for first-time or isolated 
violations, violation rates returned to their pre-reform levels.128
“Enforcement strategies matter” is a common-sense idea, but it 
has found empirical support elsewhere as well. Florida has an “un-
usually high” rate of minimum wage abuse, which researchers at 
the Economic Policy Institute attribute in part to the fact that the 
state got rid of its labor standards enforcement agency in 2002.129
When employers have little reason to fear punishment for wage 
theft, they are emboldened to steal from their workers.
120. For an overview of deterrence theory, see RONALD L. AKERS, CHRISTINE S. SELLERS &
WESLEY G. JENNINGS, CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORIES 15–34 (7th ed. 2012).
121. See Galvin, supra note 21, at 329.
122. Id.
123. E.g., D.C. CODE § 32-1307.01(a), 01(b) (2017).
124. Galvin, supra note 21, at 330.
125. Id. at 339.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 340.
128. Id.
129. COOPER & KROEGER, supra note 11, at 12.
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C. Expanding Avenues for Relief
While unpaid employees have always had the power to sue to en-
force their rights in court, this is far easier said than done. The civil 
justice system is hard to navigate for the vast majority of people. In 
particular, low-wage workers do not have legal training, familiarity 
with the civil justice system, or the ability to hire a lawyer.130 Even if 
a person does gather the resources to file a lawsuit, they are usually 
outmatched by their employers, who tend to have more economic 
and social power and, therefore, greater access to key resources 
like time, knowledge, and legal representation.
In an effort to address this imbalance, reforms attempt to make 
it easier to take formal action. This approach includes both ex-
panding administrative paths to legal action and incentivizing at-
torneys to take on wage theft cases.
Many states (and some large cities) have local equivalents of the 
federal Department of Labor (DOL) that monitor employment 
and enforce workplace laws.131 Across the country, workers are in-
creasingly able to file legal complaints with these agencies, which 
may then investigate claims, hold hearings, and issue judgments.132
In practice, however, the power and efficacy of these agencies var-
ies widely. The D.C. DOES, for example, may investigate all allega-
tions of wage theft and retaliation and order the same remedies as 
a court, including fines, liquidated damages, attorney’s fees, and 
injunctions.133 In contrast, Colorado’s Department of Labor and
Employment may only investigate claims worth $7,500 or less.134
Workers can also sue their employers in small claims court, alt-
hough there are upper limits on the value of such cases.135 This is 
not a heavily-studied forum for addressing wage theft, but recently 
some scholars have begun to urge reforms to streamline and en-
courage unpaid wage claims.136
In theory, at least, these alternative paths should provide people 
with an easy, fast, and accessible avenue for rights enforcement. In 
130. See Fritz-Mauer, supra note 12, at 102–03.
131. See Marianne Levine, Behind the Minimum Wage Fight, a Sweeping Failure to Enforce the 
Law, POLITICO (Feb. 18, 2018, 10:40 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/02/18/
minimum-wage-not-enforced-investigation-409644.
132. See, e.g., Fritz-Mauer, supra note 12, at 103 (discussing administrative hearings in 
California); D.C. CODE § 32-1308.01 (2017).
133. D.C. CODE § 32-1308.01 (2017).
134. COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-4-111(1)(a) (2014).
135. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 116.220(1) (Deering 2010) (establishing a $5,000 
limit); D.C. CODE § 11-1321 (2016) (establishing a $10,000 limit).
136. E.g., Llezlie Green, Wage Theft in Lawless Courts, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1303 (2019).
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practice, most low-wage workers are unsure where to even begin.137
Many also lack the confidence to act.138
Finally, the District has had some success experimenting with 
generous attorney’s fees as a way to induce lawyers to take on wage 
theft suits. While successful plaintiffs have long been entitled to re-
cover fees and costs under the Fair Labor Standards Act,139 the Dis-
trict’s Wage Theft Prevention Amendment Act of 2014 enshrined 
high hourly rates for attorneys.140 For example, attorneys with up to 
three years of experience have a statutory rate of almost $375 per 
hour.141
According to worker-side employment lawyers in the D.C. area, 
this fee-shifting provision has expanded access to legal representa-
tion by making a broader range of cases financially feasible. As Mi-
chael Amster, a partner at a local employment law firm, explains, 
the law “allow[s] us to take cases that we otherwise wouldn’t take. It 
allows us to be able to justify taking smaller cases . . . . Because 
frankly, in a lot of these cases you’re dealing with people who are 
making very little money and sometimes what is owed to them is 
not that much.”142 Those smaller cases are now more viable because 
the law has created a higher return for lawyers.
High hourly rates can only help so many people obtain repre-
sentation, because private attorneys are unwilling to take on claims 
with an uncertain payday. There are two main reasons why some-
body with a strong wage theft claim will nevertheless be unable to 
find an attorney. First, many low-wage workers toil for fly-by-night 
employers who operate on the margins of the system. They regu-
larly skirt labor laws and have few assets, and because of this, they 
are hard to nail down and collect money from.143
Second, most wage claims are still just too small. Two attorneys 
privately told me that they refuse to take on clients whose unpaid 
wages are less than $10,000, a high threshold for workers to meet. 
The reason this matters is because fee-shifting provisions allow vic-
torious plaintiffs to recover “reasonable” attorney’s fees; this means 
137. See Alexander & Prasad, supra note 64, at 1095.
138. Id. at 1073 (discussing retaliation and a lack of belief in the efficacy of making a 
claim); Shannon Gleeson, Brokered Pathways to Justice and Cracks in the Law: A Closer Look At the 
Claims-Making Experiences of Low-Wage Workers, 18 WORKINGUSA 77, 90–93 (2015).
139. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
140. D.C. CODE §§ 32-1308(b)(1), 32-1308.01(m)(1) (2017) (establishing that successful 
plaintiffs’ attorneys are entitled to fees calculated “pursuant to the matrix approved in Sala-
zar v. District of Columbia, 123 F. Supp. 2d 8 (D.D.C. 2000)). This matrix is also referred to as 
the Laffey Matrix. See LAFFEY MATRIX, http://www.laffeymatrix.com/see.html (last visited 
Jan. 18, 2021).
141. LAFFEY MATRIX, supra note 140.
142. Interview with Michael Amster, Partner, Zipin, Amster & Greenberg, LLC, in Silver 
Spring, Md. (2018) (transcript on file with author).
143. See CHO ET AL., supra note 80, at 10–11.
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that such fees are usually proportionally related to the value of the 
underlying claim. In reality, most low-wage workers cannot reach 
these implied threshold requirements to obtain representation.
D. Recordkeeping Requirements
Finally, anti-wage theft laws often impose new or more stringent 
recordkeeping and transparency requirements on employers.144
This places the burden on the party with the best ability to preserve 
the kind of evidence (e.g. paychecks) that is crucial to determining 
whether wage and hour laws were violated. Typically, employers 
are subject to fines and penalties for not keeping accurate rec-
ords.145 In some cases, a failure to preserve records reduces the 
burden of proof for plaintiffs, making it easier to win wage 
claims.146
In addition, new laws require employers to provide key infor-
mation in writing to new hires, including the legal name of the 
employer, rate of pay, and regular payday.147 Finally, many states 
empower government agencies to proactively investigate wage theft 
allegations, requiring employers to make their records available for 
investigators to review.148 Although this right is limited to some ex-
tent by the Fourth Amendment,149 it still has the potential to be a 
powerful enforcement tool.
E. The Realities of Wage Theft Enforcement
This collection of reforms reflects the current gold standard for 
anti-wage theft laws. On paper, they fairly compensate workers, 
significantly sanction employers, and smooth the legal process by 
creating new ways to bring claims, incentivize representation, and 
ensure the preservation of evidence. These laws also make the gov-
ernment a more active participant in the employment relationship 
by meaningfully enhancing the power of administrative agencies 
and prosecutors.
In practice, though, these powers go unused.
144. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 32-1306(d)(1) (2018); see also CAL. LAB. CODE § 226(a) (2018).
145. Lori P. Benton, An Employer’s Duty to Preserve Documents Beyond the FLSA’s Record Keep-
ing Requirements, LEXOLOGY (Oct. 17, 2018), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.
aspx?g=474cd2c1-f251-4cb8-9267-d3500e63ceeb [https://perma.cc/8RLH-QHM7].
146. E.g., Furry v. East Bay Publ’g, 30 Cal. App. 5th 1072, 1078-80 (2018); Holaway v. 
Stratasys, Inc., 771 F.3d 1057, 1059 (8th Cir. 2014).
147. E.g., D.C. CODE § 32-1008(c) (2018).
148. E.g., D.C. CODE § 32-1331.05(a) (2013); CAL. LAB. CODE § 90 (1984).
149. City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2451–54 (2015).
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Criminal penalty enhancements, for example, draw upon the 
belief that we should treat wage theft like “regular” theft.150 These 
reforms satisfy a visceral sense of justice and have made some waves 
in popular media, but they are largely hollow because few prosecu-
tors pursue criminal sanctions.151 Nationally, the Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act has criminalized “willful” minimum wage and overtime vi-
olations for decades.152 In some parts of the country, wage theft has 
long been a criminal offense under state law.153 And yet, prosecu-
tion is and always has been extremely rare.154
Likewise, very few labor standards enforcement agencies actually 
invoke their mandates by engaging in proactive investigations. In-
stead, the vast majority rely on a passive, complaint-based approach 
to enforcement. They wait for workers to come forward with com-
plaints and then work to bring a particular employer into compli-
ance.155
Part of the problem stems from the government not investing
enough resources in these agencies. The DOL, for instance, had as 
many wage and hour investigators in 2014 as in 1948, despite the 
fact that the agency now covers a workforce six times the size.156
Many state agencies are even worse off. Six states have no labor 
standards enforcement agency and 26 have fewer than 10 investi-
gators.157 And these weaknesses show. A 2009 audit by the Govern-
ment Accountability Office found significant flaws in the DOL’s
complaint process, including “delays in investigating complaints, 
complaints not recorded in the WHD database, failure to use all 
available enforcement tools because of a lack of resources, failure 
to follow up on employers who agreed to pay, and a poor com-
plaint intake process.”158 Similar problems exist even in progressive 
bastions.159
But a lack of resources is not the only reason why the govern-
ment fails to utilize the tools available to it. Agencies’ passive, wait-
and-see approach to wage theft enforcement reflects the broader 
social belief that wage theft is, fundamentally, a personal problem. 
150. Fritz-Mauer, supra note 12, at 93.
151. Id. at 118.
152. 29 U.S.C. § 216(a).
153. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 484(a) (2014); 1913 Cal. Stat. 636.
154. See NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT, Winning Wage Justice: An Advocate’s Guide to State and City 
Policies to Fight Wage Theft (2011); Fritz-Mauer, supra note 12, at 118.
155. Fine, supra note 102, at 361.
156. Galvin, supra note 21, at 325.
157. Levine, supra note 131.
158. GREGORY D. KUTZ & JONATHAN T. MEYER, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., WAGE & HOUR 
DIVISION’S COMPLAINT INTAKE AND INVESTIGATIVE PROCESSES LEAVE LOW WAGE WORKERS 
VULNERABLE TO WAGE THEFT 4 (2009).
159. E.g., CHO ET AL., supra note 80, at 4.
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Many government actors are unwilling to act proactively and ag-
gressively because doing so would upset the status quo and run 
contrary to broadly-held beliefs about wage theft.160
The above reforms, while able to make some difference, are 
premised on the belief that empowering individuals is an effective 
way to broadly attack this social problem and achieve justice for 
low-wage workers. As the next section illustrates, this belief is en-
tirely wrong. 
III. BARRIERS TO ACTION AND THE FAILURES OF REFORM
For almost a year, Maynor worked at Eastern Flavors, a mid-
range restaurant in the District.161 As with many restaurants, 
though, the attractive exterior gilded ugly inner truths.162 Maynor’s
employers only paid him about half of the minimum wage, and he 
never got overtime despite working up to 70 hours a week. When 
Maynor eventually complained about the conditions, they fired 
him. “They even tried to fight me when I left,” he says. “They threw 
soy sauce at me.”
Some of Maynor’s friends told him about an attorney they trust-
ed. When Maynor went to talk to this lawyer, he realized just how 
badly he had been mistreated. Over the course of the year, Eastern 
Flavors underpaid Maynor by about $25,000—money he sorely 
needed to support himself and his family in one of the most ex-
pensive places in the country.163
Maynor and two of his former co-workers sued. Eastern Flavors 
refused to settle, and the case went to a four-day trial. Maynor and 
his friends prevailed, and the judge ordered the restaurant to pay 
them more than $150,000, plus attorney’s fees.164 Maynor alone 
won almost $100,000, an extraordinary amount of money for a 
160. For a more detailed discussion of this mindset, see infra Section IV.C.5.
161. Interview with Maynor, Line Chef, Washington D.C. (2018) (transcript on file with 
author).
162. Studies consistently find that wage theft is common in the food service industry. See, 
e.g., BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 13, at 31; Galvin, supra note 21, at 331 (finding a 22% 
violation rate for food services and drinking place industries).
163. To compare costs of living between different places, economists rank states and cit-
ies based on their “Regional Price Parities,” or RPPs. These RPPs measures the differences in 
prices across state and city lines, and the analysis covers all consumption goods and services, 
including rent. The Bureau of Economic Analysis determined that in 2017, D.C. had the 
second highest RPP in the country. BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, BEA 19-21, REAL PERSONAL 
INCOME FOR STATES AND METROPOLITAN AREAS, 2017 (2019), https://www.bea.gov/news
/2019/real-personal-income-states-and-metropolitan-areas-2017 [https://perma.cc/F9LU-
NWCJ].
164. I verified these numbers, but I have not cited those sources to preserve Maynor’s
anonymity.
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man who had been making $5 an hour just a year earlier. When we 
spoke more than fifteen months later, Maynor had only recovered 
a third of this judgment. This was still enough to change his life, 
and he and his attorneys were preparing to place a lien on his for-
mer employer’s property to recover the rest.
Maynor speaks glowingly of his lawyers and the process. “It’s an 
example for everyone because so many people are afraid to go talk 
to a lawyer,” he says. “And so they just suffer, and they suffer. They 
live in fear with their arms crossed, but afterwards I felt really good 
because the law is the law, and what’s correct is correct.”
* * *
Maynor’s story is the one we like to tell. It represents the best 
that anti-wage theft reforms have to offer. It is inspiring, a David-
and-Goliath tale of hardship, struggle, and vindication. Maynor’s
employers violated his basic rights and exploited his vulnerabilities, 
and he was abused even beyond the basic degradation inherent in 
wage theft. But through dedication and courage, he brought to
bear the full weight of the law and found justice. In the end, it did 
not matter that Maynor speaks almost no English, has little money,
is almost certainly undocumented, dropped out of school in the 
second-grade, and has no legal knowledge. Because of the Dis-
trict’s’s recent anti-wage theft reforms, he received compensation
not only for his lost wages, but for the trouble he had to go 
through to get them, and he did not have to pay any money for the 
outcome. Maynor simply reached out, placed his hands on the lev-
ers of power that the law made available, and walked away much 
better for it.
This tale fits neatly into the belief that private legal remedies can 
effectively solve social problems. But this story is also extremely ra-
re, the strong exception to a stark truth: under the current system, 
the overwhelming majority of low-wage people who experience 
wage theft have no real avenues for recourse.
The reforms discussed in Part II have been broadly accompa-
nied by a sense of accomplishment among those who pass them. In
some ways, this feeling is well-deserved. This new wave of laws re-
flects an earnest desire to address wage theft, to grant working 
people the tools they need to enforce their own rights, and to cre-
ate fair and dignified workplaces. When invoked and enforced, an-
ti-wage theft reforms upend the age-old power dynamic and pro-
vide aggrieved workers with a real path to redress.
But there is a crippling problem with an approach that de-
pends—and in fact requires—low-wage workers to drive enforce-
ment. The fact is, low-wage workers overwhelmingly lack—or at 
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least believe they lack—the practical ability to hold their employers 
accountable for violations of their rights. As this Part explains, an 
enforcement regime based on the misconception that individual 
empowerment is an acceptable way to address a problem like wage 
theft is fundamentally flawed because the vast majority of low-wage 
workers do not take formal legal action over their rights violations. 
There is no question that the statutory reforms discussed in Part II 
are important. But, as long as remedies emphasize personal em-
powerment and a complaint-based approach to enforcement, they 
will fail, afflicting little more than a surface-level attack on the 
problem.
A. Wage Theft, Disputing, and the Safe Path of Silence
To fully grasp why the standard approach to fighting wage theft 
is destined to fail, it is crucial to understand when, why, and how 
people take action over their own mistreatment. Or, in this case, 
why so many do not.
Sociolegal scholars who study the civil justice system have spent a 
great deal of time analyzing the process through which people 
“name,” “blame,” and “claim”—that is, when and how people rec-
ognize an injury (name), assign responsibility (blame), and take 
action (claim).165 This research has revealed that there are many 
potential legal disputes that people never act upon.166
Disputes are social constructs. Whether a given situation will 
evolve into a legal claim depends heavily on social context and per-
sonal understandings.167 An extensive body of research on disput-
ing shows that the ability and willingness to name a problem, 
blame somebody for it, and bring a claim depends heavily on who 
somebody is and how their thinking has been influenced.168 As so-
ciologist Rebecca Sandefur explains, “studies frequently . . . reveal 
powerful influences of local social context on how disputes are un-
derstood and pursued.”169
This “local social context” can greatly impact how a person 
thinks about and responds to their experiences. Many factors mat-
165. See, e.g., KITTY CALAVITA & VALERIE JENNESS, APPEALING TO JUSTICE: PRISONER 
GRIEVANCES, RIGHTS, AND CARCERAL LOGIC (2015); Catherine Albiston, Lauren B. Edelman 
& Joy Milligan, The Dispute Tree and the Legal Forest, 10 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 105 (2014);
William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and Transformation of 
Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming, 15 L. & SOC’Y REV. 631 (1981).
166. Albiston et al., supra note 165, at 106.
167. See id. at 114–17.
168. See id.
169. Rebecca Sandefur, Access to Civil Justice and Race, Class, and Gender Inequality, 34 ANN.
REV. SOC. 339, 342 (2008).
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ter, including widespread cultural beliefs, a person’s own back-
ground and upbringing, socioeconomic status, and race.170 Also 
important are “agents of transformation”—people and organiza-
tions, including nonprofits, friends, and government officials, who 
shape, guide, and manage beliefs and expectations.171
This analysis really boils down to questions of power and influ-
ence. If a person who is wronged has more social power and re-
sources and has been encouraged to think about an experience as 
a legal problem, then they are more likely to take action. Members 
of groups that are lower in the social hierarchy (like poor people, 
those without much formal education, and minorities) perceive 
fewer problems and make fewer claims.172 For example, we would 
expect an upper-class white person whose mother is a lawyer to be 
more likely to file a lawsuit or administrative complaint than a low-
income person of color who does not know any attorneys. To some 
extent, this divergence is about resources and the kinds of prob-
lems people have. Wealthier people are better equipped to pursue 
legal action and are also more likely to have disputes with higher 
stakes. But these factors do not fully explain the entire relationship 
between class position and action. Lower-income people are also 
less likely to pursue disputes because of a general sense of power-
lessness and a lack of faith in the system.173
Wage theft represents a potential dispute, which workers may 
recognize (name), assign responsibility for (blame), and pursue 
through a variety of formal and informal processes (claim). In light 
of the attention that wage theft has received, we might expect low-
wage workers to regularly take legal action over their pay-based 
rights violations. After all, there has been a growing social move-
ment dedicated to empowering these people, both legally and per-
sonally, and the interventions discussed in Part II of this Article 
have been designed for just that purpose.
But this is far from the case. Overwhelmingly, people who suffer 
wage theft do not take any legal action.174 Despite the harm of the 
crime and its (often flagrant) illegality, almost no low-wage workers 
step forward.
Unlike some other potential disputes—e.g., a faulty product in-
volving multiple potential responsible parties—”blaming” for wage 
theft is straightforward. People understand that their employers 
170. For an empirical discussion of these various factors, see generally Albiston et al., 
supra note 165.
171. See id. at 106.
172. Id. at 124; Sandefur, supra note 169, at 346.
173. See Sandefur, supra note 169, at 347.
174. See Alexander & Prasad, supra note 64, at 1089.
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are responsible for paying, or not paying, their wages. Instead, the 
real problems for disputing wage theft arise at the “naming” and 
“claiming” phases.
B. Naming Wage Theft
Naming an act of wage theft as an injury is a crucial first step to 
action. Before a person will assert their rights, they must under-
stand what those rights are and how they have been violated. A 
wealth of empirical research supports the idea that “inaccurate or 
incomplete knowledge of the law can limit one’s willingness and 
ability to assert their rights.”175 For example, in her study of the 
Family and Medical Leave Act, sociolegal scholar Catherine Albis-
ton found that people who had basic information about their 
rights felt more empowered.176 Rights awareness itself provided 
workers with both a legal and moral justification for speaking up.177
Research concludes that many low-wage workers do not have a 
clear understanding of their workplace rights. One analysis found 
that almost 60% “misunderstood their minimum wage and over-
time rights,” with people frequently overestimating and underes-
timating the applicable minimum wage.178 Significant gaps in un-
derstanding exist even among undocumented workers, for whom 
law is particularly salient and who are frequently the targets of 
know-your-rights outreach efforts.179 A survey of day laborers de-
termined that 45% did not know the applicable minimum wage
and 21% did not realize it is illegal to pay less than minimum wage.
Fewer than half knew both of these facts.180
Confusion over substantive rights commonly arises in conversa-
tions with low-wage workers. Jack, for example, has been embroiled 
in a dispute with his former employer, a large and successful res-
taurant.181 Jack played two roles, working as both a server and a ca-
terer. “In catering I was probably putting in about 20 hours a 
week,” he explains, and “[w]ith the waiting tables I was probably 
175. Mary Nell Trautner, Erin Hatton & Kelly E. Smith, What Workers Want Depends: Legal 
Knowledge and the Desire for Workplace Change Among Day Laborers, 35 L. & POL’Y 319, 320 
(2013).
176. See Catherine Albiston, Bargaining in the Shadow of Social Institutions: Competing Dis-
courses and Social Change in Workplace Mobilization of Civil Rights, 39 L. & SOC’Y REV. 11, 13–14
(2005).
177. Id. at 28–29.
178. Alexander & Prasad, supra note 64, at 1072.
179. See id. at 1093–95.
180. Trautner et al., supra note 175, at 330–31.
181. Interview with Jack, Artist & Server, in Washington, D.C. (2018) (transcript on file 
with author).
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putting in 30 hours a week.”182 Separately, that is. Working 50
hours a week for a single employer means that Jack should have 
been paid for ten hours of overtime. He was not, but Jack did not 
realize that this was illegal. Instead, he viewed his two roles as in-
dependent of one another, even though both his basic job duties 
and his employer stayed the same.183 As a result, he never pursued a 
claim for unpaid overtime.
Not knowing the law is not the only barrier to naming. Workers 
must also understand that their particular situations are illegal. 
Even some who know their rights fail to realize that their own ex-
periences constitute mistreatment. It is not easy or convenient for 
people to track their hours, check their own records against their 
paystubs, and do the weekly math required to verify that they are 
being paid correctly.184
In short, lack of knowledge is a significant problem in a system 
reliant on worker complaints. But there is also a great deal of nu-
ance missing from this discussion. Despite the research presented 
here, it is also the case that—at least in D.C.—low-wage workers are 
largely aware of their own wage theft. This might sound contradic-
tory. How can a group of people with poor knowledge of their 
rights also be generally aware of their own mistreatment? The an-
swer lies in the fact that wage theft is usually nothing more than a 
violation of a person’s most basic entitlements. Although “wage 
theft” is an umbrella term that covers many different offenses, the 
most common forms violate our country’s oldest and most rudi-
mentary workplace laws.185 These laws are longstanding and also 
coincide with our own cultural and moral understandings of how 
things should be. In other words, it does not take much knowledge 
to understand the wrongness of the broad range of violations that 
low-income people suffer. Beyond that, even if workers do not im-
mediately identify that their rights are being violated, they often 
become aware after the fact.
Most of the time, then, the real barrier to action is not a lack of 
knowledge, especially in a place as progressive and socially active as 
D.C., where there are many sources of information available to 
teach people about their rights, including radio and bus adver-
tisements, non-profit and advocacy organizations, and friends and 
coworkers. Even as the details of these laws escape workers, who 
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. This is especially true for tipped workers, who have to deal with the added difficulty 
of tracking their tips. Tips are usually a mix of cash and credit and often come in on a delay, 
which makes it hard to line them up with particular paychecks and workweeks.
185. See, for example, Fritz-Mauer, supra note 12, at 78–82, for a discussion of the incep-
tion of minimum wage and overtime laws.
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sometimes misstate the applicable minimum wage or fail to under-
stand how quickly they accrue paid sick days, most people who 
have been cheated eventually learn of it.
This discussion raises questions. People who experience wage 
theft are deeply affected by it. In many places, like the District, 
there are also powerful, pro-worker laws designed to ease the path 
to civil justice, send a powerful message about the wrongness of 
wage theft, and provide redress. And yet, working people do not 
take formal legal action. They do not pursue the remedies en-
shrined in law. Across the board, complaint rates are extremely 
low.186 One study found that almost 98% of workers who perceive 
workplace rights violations (consisting mainly of wage theft) do not 
pursue their claims through the civil justice system.187 Why? In the 
age of an ascendant left-wing in Democratic politics with growing 
pro-worker grassroots movements, economic inequality and the 
experiences of working people are the focus of a national conver-
sation, and this attention has resulted in sweeping reforms. So why, 
then, do workers fail to take action? As the next section explains, 
the real barriers to individualized enforcement arise at the claim-
ing phase.
C. Barriers to Claiming: Retaliation, Lack of Confidence, and 
Power Dynamics
The majority of low-wage workers who name their legal injuries 
give up at the claiming phase. During the claiming phase, a worker 
confronts the person or entity who they blame for their wage theft 
and demands a remedy.188 Claiming can take a variety of forms and 
includes everything from talking to a supervisor to filing a law-
suit.189
Analyzing data from the 2008 survey of 4,400 low-wage workers, 
Charlotte Alexander and Arthi Prasad concluded that only 57% of 
those who felt their rights had been violated at work made any 
186. David Weil, Creating a Strategic Enforcement Approach to Wage Theft: One Academic’s
Journey in Organizational Change, 60 J. INDUS. REL. 1, 8 (2018); David Weil & Amanda Pyles, 
Why Complain-Complaints, Compliance, and the Problem of Enforcement in the U.S. Workplace, 27 
COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 59, 69 (2005).
187. See Alexander & Prasad, supra note 64, at 1085–86, 1089. Although the authors did 
not do this math themselves, it is straightforward: Out of 4,387 workers total, 33% perceived 
rights violations, 57% of those made a claim of any kind, and 4% of those who made a claim 
did so formally. (4387) x (.33) x (.57) x (.04) = 33 workers who made a formal claim out of 
1,447 who perceived rights violations, yielding a formal complaint rate of about 2.3%.
188. Albiston et al., supra note 165, at 106.
189. Id. at 106–09.
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kind of claim in the year prior to the survey.190 Of those who did 
speak up, 96% did so informally by speaking to their employers.191
Only four percent of those who made claims, then, tried to take 
the kind of formal legal action envisioned by the reforms discussed 
in Part II. Parsed out, this means that of all the low-income workers
in the survey who believed their employers broke the law, only 
about two percent went to the government or a private attorney for 
help.192
There are three significant “barriers to claiming” that effectively 
prevent low-income people from taking legal action. Working peo-
ple frequently report that what stops them from really pursuing
rights enforcement is: 1) fear of retaliation; 2) concern about navi-
gating the system successfully; and 3) a lack of personal power and 
faith in the government.
These barriers to claiming are not mutually exclusive but over-
lapping. Fearing retaliation, for example, is inherently linked to a 
perceived lack of power and faith in government. After all, if a per-
son believed they had the power to enforce their own rights, or 
had confidence that the government could and would protect 
them, they would not be afraid of employer reprisal. What these 
issues, discussed in more detail below, have in common is that they 
are all inextricably tied to workers’ low positions on the social and 
economic hierarchies that structure society.
1.  Fear of Retaliation
The biggest explanation for why low-wage workers do not at-
tempt to assert their rights, either at all or to a significant degree, is 
because they are afraid of retaliation.193 Retaliation can take many 
forms. Supervisors bully and intimidate workers who complain, cut 
their hours, adjust their schedules without warning, contact immi-
gration authorities, and find excuses to terminate, suspend, or 
otherwise discipline them.
While all retaliation is intimidating and unpleasant, the worst—
and most effective—is the kind that reduces earnings. Especially 
for those who live in poverty or just on the edge of it, income is an 
190. Alexander & Prasad, supra note 64, at 1084.
191. Id. at 1089.
192. This statistic worsens once one accounts for the fact that some people fail to under-
stand when their employers violate their rights. Given that many low-wage workers lack 
rights knowledge, the best empirical evidence suggests that far fewer than 2% of those who 
suffer wage theft take formal legal action over it.
193. The problems with retaliation are well-documented, as are workers’ concerns. See 
supra note 138.
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overriding concern. Low-wage workers have little—if anything—in 
the way of savings,194 and, as discussed in Part I, even a temporary 
loss of income can have a devastating impact on a person’s way of 
life. Many times, even a bad employer who steals wages is better 
than no employer and the looming prospect of debt, hunger, and 
homelessness.
Workers, wage theft attorneys, and workers’ rights activists well 
understand these facts. Joanna Blotner, an advocate at Jews United 
for Justice in Washington, D.C., speaks for many when she explains 
that
for most people, the most important thing is keeping what-
ever the bare minimum income is, keeping that job. It’s
much worse to be out of a job and start that search process 
over again and scramble for income in the in-between. . . .
Losing a job is almost guaranteed losing housing, losing 
whatever other supports and bills you’ve got to pay in your 
life.195
Fear of retaliation reflects the power imbalance inherent in em-
ployer-employee relationships and is also justified by data. Approx-
imately 43% of respondents in the landmark study of 4,400 low-
wage workers reported suffering employer retaliation as a result of 
their most recent workplace-related claim.196 Many workers in the 
District also speak at length about their experiences with retalia-
tion and how they have learned that enduring wage theft can cost 
less than fighting it. In total, just under half of my respondents ex-
pressed being afraid of retaliation.
Ruben, for example, was used to long hours at the Homeless 
Youth Retreat, a non-profit organization.197 A large, cheerful man, 
he speaks passionately about the mission of the organization and 
his willingness to put forth time and effort. “[W]ithin a two-week 
period, I was knocking out hours, like 88, 96, 104, 112,” he says. “I
was crushin’ ‘em!”198 Ruben, however, earned the same rate for 
every hour he worked,199 no overtime, even though he was not ex-
empt. At first, he tried to talk to his supervisors about it. “Fuck 
194. Supra note 47.
195. Interview with Joanna Blotner, Legis. Dir., D.C. Fam. & Econ. Sec. Campaigns, Jews 
United for Just., in Washington, D.C. (2018) (transcript on file with author).
196. Alexander & Prasad, supra note 64, at 1073.
197. Interview with Ruben, Security Guard & Couns., in Washington, D.C. (2018) (tran-
script on file with author).
198. Id.
199. Id.
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you,” one of them told him. “We not paying you, man. You lucky 
we paying you that!”200
For many, this would have been the end of it. But Ruben could 
not let it go. He is college-educated, a veteran, and he knew he was 
right. He filed a wage claim with the D.C. DOES, which eventually 
determined that his employer owed him about a thousand dollars, 
plus penalties.201 After some negotiations mediated by the agency, 
Ruben walked away with about $2,500 before taxes.202
That was still not the end of his saga, though. “[N]ow that all the 
smoke has cleared, I’m not getting more hours,” Ruben says.203 He 
has gone from working more than 80 hours every two weeks to on-
ly a single shift. “I want to play it off, but one day?” Ruben asks, in-
credulous. “Just one day? I got scheduled two days a month? I’ve 
been with you more than fifteen years and that’s all I get called 
for? Is this retaliation behind me going to court?” Ruben does not 
think he can prove it, but he got the message: “I don’t argue no 
more. I stopped arguing.”204
Others have similar stories. James, a grocery store employee, no-
ticed his paychecks were missing hours. He spoke up multiple 
times, and although his employer repeatedly paid him back, his 
supervisors became increasingly hostile. They cut his hours; trans-
ferred him to a store far from his home; and cooked up reasons to 
yell at, abuse, and punish him. “I’m almost afraid to ask for my 
money, and it shouldn’t be like that!” he says, his frustration plain. 
Would he speak up again? “[I]t does discourage you. . . . I got my 
check that’s coming up next week, it’s going to be messed up . . . .
And I’m not going to say anything. I’m going to leave it alone.”205
Retaliating against a single outspoken employee can have a 
powerful ripple effect. Targets get the message, but so too do their 
coworkers. Like James, Miranda’s employer began to cut her hours 
after she complained that her paycheck was short.206 Some of her 
coworkers wanted to take action over the same problem but ulti-
mately did not. “[T]hey was scared of the backlash,” Miranda ex-
plains, “[like] how they shortened my hours.”207
We think of low-wage jobs as ubiquitous and therefore easy to 






205. Telephone Interview with James, supra note 78.
206. Interview with Miranda, supra note 65.
207. Id.
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there is a low barrier to entry.208 This way of thinking implicitly as-
sumes that if a worker loses their job, they can easily find another 
similar one. Broadly speaking, this might be true. It might be the 
case that in the aggregate, low-wage people are able to find new 
jobs relatively quickly. But the interim between leaving one job and 
starting a new one is frightening, even if it only lasts a week or two, 
and many report that economic insecurity buys silence. Marcos, for 
instance, spent years working as a dishwasher, and explains that 
although he felt “terrible” about his wage theft, he had to put up 
with it because he “didn’t know where else to look for work.”209
This generalized fear worsens when people have particular 
points of vulnerability that leave them especially open to exploita-
tion. Being older, having dependents, or having a criminal convic-
tion are all the kinds of qualities that make a person particularly 
vulnerable. Marion, for example, was convicted of a sex offense 
and also struggles to support her son.210 “It’s hard because I have a 
record now, and sometimes I don’t get [interviews], sometimes I 
get interviews that go well, sometimes they be like ‘I can’t hire you 
because of your background.’ “211 At her last job, Marion was not 
exempt from overtime under either D.C or federal law, but her 
employer only paid her for 40 hours a week, even though she 
worked about 60.212 She sometimes went hungry and often had to 
scrounge or borrow bus money so she could go to work.213 Alt-
hough Marion knew she could file a complaint with the D.C. 
DOES, she did not. “I was like, ‘I’ll take the experience because I 
need it on my resume,’ “ she explains.214
Perhaps the biggest inflection point for worker exploitation is 
immigration status, which helps explain why foreign-born workers 
are especially susceptible to wage theft.215 In Wage Theft in America,
author and activist Kim Bobo discusses this issue:
208. See, e.g., Matthew Castillon, 70% of Workers Are Likely to Quit at Current $7.25 Federal 
Minimum Wage in ‘Brutal’ Turnover Cycle, CNBC (Sept. 25, 2019, 8:30 AM), https://www.cnbc.
com/2019/09/25/70percent-of-workers-are-likely-to-quit-at-current-federal-minimum-
wage.html [https://perma.cc/QZ8G-K64J]. An analysis by CNBC determined that turnover 
rate is more than twice the national average when employees are paid the federal minimum 
wage of $7.25. Id.
209. Interview with Marcos, Dishwasher, in Washington, D.C. (2018) (transcript on file 
with author).
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Because our nation has no rational immigration system 
providing a path to citizenship and no strong worker pro-
tections for immigrants, many immigrants find themselves 
in vulnerable situations. They are desperate to work to sup-
port themselves and their families; at the same time, they 
face enormous backlash from communities that are scape-
goating the nation’s economic woes on immigrants (not a
new approach in U.S. history), and they are terrified of be-
ing deported. This creates a context that makes it easy for 
employers to exploit undocumented workers.216
For an unscrupulous employer, the cheapest labor comes without 
papers. Undocumented immigrants can be—and frequently are—
paid less than the minimum wage, or nothing at all, because em-
ployers understand that many of these people live in fear of the 
law. This situation constitutes what Professor Elizabeth Fussell dubs 
the “deportation threat dynamic,” where employers assume, often 
correctly, that the Spanish-speaking people they hire will not re-
port wage theft because they are afraid of government authori-
ties.217
Concerns over retaliation exist even in places with powerful anti-
retaliation laws. The District, for instance, prohibits “any person 
acting on behalf of the employer” from threatening or punishing 
any person who has made a complaint or “is believed to have made 
a complaint” to any person alleging that they have not been paid 
properly.218 This is a broad prohibition. Read plainly, it covers not 
only workers who go to the government or file a lawsuit, but also 
those who informally complain to their supervisors that they have 
been underpaid.
But retaliation is a hard thing to prove. Along with almost every 
state, the District practices at-will employment, which means that 
employers can fire workers for almost any reason or for no reason 
at all.219 It is easy for employers to come up with alternative, plausi-
ble excuses for why somebody has been let go or had their hours 
reduced, understanding that the real reason can be shrouded be-
hind the logic of at-will employment. Even when the District gov-
ernment finds out about alleged retaliation, it is slow to act. In fis-
216. BOBO, supra note 10, at 46.
217. Elizabeth Fussell, The Deportation Threat Dynamic and Victimization of Latino Migrants: 
Wage Theft and Robbery, 52 SOC. Q. 593, 593–96 (2011); see also Gleeson, supra note 138, at 91, 
97.
218. D.C. CODE § 32-1311(a)–(b) (2017).
219. At-Will Employment – Overview, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (Apr. 15, 2008), 
https://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/at-will-employment-overview.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/C9YB-2FWL].
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cal year 2019, the DOES took an average of 42 days to even contact 
employers accused of retaliation and 117 days to resolve those 
complaints.220 Many times, this is too little, too late. Given the pre-
carious nature of low-wage workers’ lives, the damage has already 
been done before the agency reaches out to the employer.
2.  Concerns Over Navigating the System
“I live in a world of fear. So, I haven’t really worked steady in a 
while,” says Agda, who moonlights as a bartender while pursuing 
an advanced degree.221 “I have a kid to support and bills to pay. 
The stress level is insurmountable some days, you know? It’s really 
hard.”222 As is common in the service industry,223 Agda’s employers 
have, over the years, stolen her tips, paid less than promised, and 
paid less than minimum wage.224 Like many, Agda is aware of her 
rights and expresses anger over these acts. But despite this, she has 
never taken formal legal action. 
[I]t’s a lot of work . . . a lot of follow up. They want this, 
they want that, then they want to call the employer and 
then it’s like, you know, either you’ve moved on from that 
job and you just don’t want to deal with it anymore, you 
don’t want to see them anymore, or it didn’t end well any-
way . . . . [Y]ou just don’t want to deal with it, you know? 
There’s a lot of mental aspects to it.225
These feelings are common. Legal claims are time consuming 
and intimidating, and many low-wage workers report that they do 
not pursue their legal claims because they feel ill-equipped to navi-
gate the legal system. Among those I spoke to, more than half 
(55%) named this barrier to claiming, which has two aspects: 
workers lack the procedural knowledge of how and where to assert 
their rights, and they are also—like Agda—intimidated by the pro-
spect of legal action.
Many ordinary people do not understand even the basics of how 
to bring a lawsuit or make an administrative claim. For most, a law-
220. Letter from Tony A. Robinson, FOIA Officer, Dep’t of Emp. Servs., to author (Dec. 
2, 2019) [hereinafter D.C. FOIA Data 2019] (on file with author) (unpublished response to 
Freedom of Information Act Request).
221. Interview with Agda, Bartender & Student, in Washington, D.C. (2018) (transcript 
on file with author).
222. Id.
223. See Galvin, supra note 21, at 331.
224. Interview with Agda, supra note 221.
225. Id.
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suit is out of the question. Even filing one is complicated, to say 
nothing of the many processes that follow.226 The confusing nature 
of the legal system, after all, is a big part of the reason why people 
hire lawyers.
In theory, agencies like the DOES are supposed to provide a 
softer and more accessible avenue for rights enforcement. In prac-
tice, many workers are unsure of how to even take the first step to 
trigger these agency procedures. Charlotte Alexander and Arthi 
Prasad found that 77% of surveyed low-wage workers did not know 
how or where to file a complaint about their workplace issues.227 In 
short, “low-wage, front-line workers often lack the legal knowledge”
to meaningfully enforce their own rights.228
This is partly due to the confusing and sprawling nature of the 
administrative state. There are multiple federal agencies that regu-
late workplace civil rights, including the DOL, the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and the National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB). To make things more confusing, there 
are also parallel state- and city-level agencies. In the District, there 
is the DOES, the Public Employee Relations Board, and the Office 
of Human Rights.
As with low-wage workers in general, many people in the District 
do not know where to begin to figure out how to assert their rights. 
“I don’t know where I should go or to whom I should talk,” says 
Sabbir, a former fast food worker who never got overtime.229 “And 
maybe there’s a way we can fight about it, but I don’t know the way, 
how I should start, or how to do it.”230 Even those who are familiar 
with, for example, the DOES express confusion. Cora, who we met 
in the Introduction, speaks well of DOES and has participated in a 
variety of agency-run programs designed to help out-of-work resi-
dents. But when asked whether she might file a wage claim, she 
expresses confusion: “I don’t know. And I wouldn’t know how to 
do it.”231
But workers who know what they can do are nevertheless reluc-
tant to take formal legal action because they are not confident that 
they can successfully navigate the system. Like Agda, these workers 
are not held back by a lack of procedural knowledge but a desire to 
avoid a process that is intimidating, confusing, time-consuming, 
and emotionally draining. The path of least resistance often in-
226. See Fritz-Mauer, supra note 12, at 102–03 (2016).
227. Alexander & Prasad, supra note 64, at 1095.
228. Id. at 1098.
229. Telephone Interview with Sabbir, supra note 63.
230. Id.
231. Interview with Cora, supra note 2.
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volves ignoring the problem or moving on. In many ways, and for 
many people, it is easier to swallow the frustration and pain of 
wage theft than to deal with the hassle of fighting an uphill battle.
For example, Miranda worked at a large department store that 
frequently underpaid her.232 After it happened once, she started to 
carefully track her hours in a notebook. Four or five times, she 
used her own records to confront her supervisor; four or five times, 
her employer cut her a check.233 Not surprisingly, Miranda was not 
alone. “[My supervisor] gave me a check, and after I did it, four 
other people had to get checks!” Miranda says.234 The employees 
got together and talked about filing a group complaint with DOES, 
but ultimately gave up the idea. “I thought about going to the wage 
and labor board,” she explains, 
because a lot of people were complaining about it and I 
thought, ‘there’s power in numbers.’ If a group of us feel 
that we’ve been treated unfairly, then probably it’d be 
quicker than it just being one person. But of course, mostly
everybody at that point that was going through the same in-
justice I was going through just wanted to get the hell out 
of there.235
Eventually, that is what Miranda herself did, deciding it would be 
simpler and easier to just move on to a new job.236
3.  Lack of Power, Lack of Faith
The last major barrier to claiming is that many low-wage workers 
do not believe that speaking up will do any good. Agitating at work 
or filing a complaint is not likely to achieve justice, and worse, 
could carry significant costs. There are also two aspects to this bar-
rier to claiming: First, low-wage workers have a keen understanding 
of the stark power imbalance that exists between them and their 
employers; second, they lack faith in the government, and do not 
believe that it will protect or advocate for them.
As discussed in Section III.C.1, this imbalance is amplified when 
a person is economically or socially vulnerable, which explains why 
wage theft is more pronounced among the working poor, undoc-
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umented immigrants, non-unionized employees, women, and mi-
norities.237 As Maria, a cleaner, puts it, “[employers] have the mon-
ey, they have the power, and it’s your word against their word so I 
don’t think there’s anything you can really do about it.”238
Employers understand this power imbalance, and many use it to 
their advantage. When Ameen’s former boss, an ambassador to the 
United States, taunted him by inviting him to file a lawsuit over his 
unpaid wages,239 the ambassador was relying on the fact that 
Ameen has very little money and no legal knowledge. When Cora’s
supervisor threatened to fire her after Cora demanded her wag-
es,240 she was sending a clear message about speaking up. Employ-
ers like these, who refuse to comply with the most basic workplace 
laws, do so confidently because they can do so with impunity. It is a 
theme that activists and attorneys see repeatedly. Allen Cardenas, 
who coordinated a legal clinic that focuses heavily on wage theft 
complaints, explains that:
Fear and intimidation [are] what threaten[] workers the 
most. . . . They usually have family to support, they have 
bills, and they don’t have the time to stop working and find 
a new job if they raise hell at their current job. Stability’s
important for them, and I understand why you’re scared to 
ruffle some feathers, because it could cost you your job and 
it might mean that your kids can’t eat.241
Workers hear these messages loud and clear, and they understand 
how employers strategize around this power dynamic. “[W]hen 
people know they can take advantage of others to their own bene-
fits, and they know the other person is kind of scared to even reach 
out or even find information, they have what they want,” says Na-
omi, summing up the perspective of many.242 This power imbal-
ance, of course, also feeds into the fear of retaliation that many 
people have. As discussed above, retaliation can take many forms 
and be hard to prove, and workplace disputes often come down to 
one person’s word against another’s. This is thin proof upon which 
237. COOPER & KROEGER, supra note 11, at 8, 21–28; BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 13, at 
41–48.
238. Telephone Interview with Maria, Cleaner, in Washington, D.C. (2018) (transcript 
on file with author).
239. Interview with Ameen, supra note 54.
240. Interview with Cora, supra note 2.
241. Interview with Allen Cardenas, Clinic Coordinator, Washington Laws.’ Comm. for 
Civ. Rts. and Urb. Affs., in Washington, D.C. (2018) (transcript on file with author).
242. Interview with Naomi, Low-wage Worker, in Washington, D.C. (2018) (transcript on 
file with author).
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to risk a claim and, perhaps even worse, retaliation. One stake-
holder describes a typical retaliatory event:
When you’re told you’ll be taken off the schedule, it’s not 
like you’re getting a formal e-mail in writing where you 
have any proof of this. It’s an interpersonal conversation, 
oftentimes with nobody else around to hear. It’s your word 
against theirs, so workers have very little power to react 
against it, to push back, to prove offensive retaliation where 
it is happening in the workplace.243
This present lack of power that many people feel is compounded 
by the second aspect to this barrier to claiming: many low-income 
people lack faith in the government and do not trust it to serve 
them well. In D.C.—as well as many other places—this belief is jus-
tified by the poor job that the government does at enforcing basic 
wage and hour laws. This might sound surprising. After all, the Dis-
trict recently passed one of the most powerful anti-wage theft laws 
in the country.244 But the fact is, D.C. and many other governments 
are largely inactive.245 Responsible agencies fail to build lasting re-
lationships around the issue, investigate wrongdoing, process com-
plaints quickly, and vigorously apply the law.
The numbers from the District tell the story of a government 
agency failing its mandate. In the District, the sub-agency responsi-
ble for investigating and remediating wage theft is the Office of 
Wage-Hour (OWH), which is contained within DOES. OWH has 
about 30 full-time employees and an annual budget of approxi-
mately $3.6 million.246
These might sound like large numbers, but they are inadequate 
compared to the frequency and impact of wage theft. OWH simply 
does not have the staff or money that it should. Beyond that, 
though, the agency itself does a poor job of enforcement. In par-
ticular, there are three serious problems with OWH, which are 
likely repeated in dozens of places across the country, and which 
contribute to workers’ lack of faith in the government.
First, OWH misses the overwhelming majority of instances of 
wage theft. By its own numbers, it does not learn of more than 
99.5% of all minimum wage violations, receiving fewer than 100 
complaints while conservatively estimating that there are nearly 
243. Interview with Joanna Blotner, supra note 195.
244. See infra Section IV.A.
245. See supra Section II.E.
246. GOV’T OF D.C., FY 2020 APPROVED BUDGET AND FINANCIAL PLAN B-94 (2019).
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40,000 violations per year.247 And although employers commit wage 
theft in all its various forms with stunning frequency, the agency 
receives only 700–800 wage theft-related complaints total each 
year.
Second, workers who go to OWH experience significant delays 
and problems, leaving many feeling cast aside and ill-served. To be 
fair, OWH has made improvements to its timeline in recent years, 
and in fiscal year 2019 even adhered to the statutory requirement 
that it issue an initial ruling within 60 days of serving an employer 
with a complaint.248 In crucial ways, though, it is slow and ineffi-
cient. It takes about 51 days to serve an employer. Worst of all, re-
taliation complaints languish. On average, it takes the agency 
about 117 days to resolve complaints—including six weeks to even 
make initial contact with the employer.
Olivia experienced these delays firsthand. After she filed a claim 
for unpaid wages using DOES’ online form, she heard nothing for 
three weeks.249 Eventually, she contacted OWH, who put her in 
touch with the investigator in charge of her case. Over the next 
several weeks, he asked her questions she had already answered 
and requested documents she had already submitted—in some 
cases more than once.250 In particular, it was clear that the agency 
had lost the key pieces of evidence she had attached to her initial 
complaint, including her offer letter, pay stubs, and termination 
letter.251 It took the agency seven weeks to even issue a complaint to 
her former employer, and for the next six months she saw almost 
no movement on her claim.252
There are real costs to this beyond the aggravation of slow-
moving justice. A great deal can happen in a short amount of time, 
especially to vulnerable people. For example, after Lisa, a counse-
lor at a transitional living facility for teen moms, successfully pur-
sued a claim for unpaid overtime through OWH, her employer, a 
faith-based non-profit, suddenly and illegally evicted her from the 
apartment complex that the organization housed its employees 
in.253 Lisa wound up living in her car, depressed, hungry, and des-
247. In a study commissioned by DOES, researchers used Census data to estimate the 
frequency of minimum wage violations in the District, and predicted that in 2015, 39,502 
were paid less than the minimum wage. YE ZHANG, MASON MILLER & PAULA MIAN, MINIMUM 
WAGE IMPACT STUDY 39 (2017). The office, however, receives fewer than 100 complaints an-
nually involving “minimum wage/overtime.” D.C. FOIA Data 2019, supra note 220, at 3.
248. See D.C. FOIA Data 2019, supra note 220, at 3.




253. Interview with Lisa, Couns., in Washington, D.C. (2018) (transcript on file with au-
thor).
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perate.254 She filed a retaliation complaint with OWH, but it never 
went anywhere.255 She saw some movement early on, but only in the 
face of Lisa’s “persistent persistence.”256 “I would push it [for-
ward],” Lisa explains, “then I would stand back because I didn’t
want to go through the pain” of having to constantly pursue jus-
tice.257 Almost two years after the fact, Lisa had given up on the 
agency resolving her retaliation claim one way or the other. 
“There’s no driving force from their end . . . ,” she says.258
The third crippling problem with OWH is that the agency im-
poses light judgments and collects little money. District law states 
that the government “shall” (meaning must259) require employers 
who steal wages to pay aggrieved workers liquidated damages equal 
to triple their unpaid wages.260 The only way employers can avoid 
this mandate is by admitting their fault when the agency first con-
tacts them, which reduces the liquidated damages from 300% of 
unpaid wages to just 100%.261 Realistically, few employers take this 
route. Instead, the strong majority ignore the agency or contest the 
claims, meaning it is reasonable to expect that if OWH is applying 
the law as written, aggregate liquidated damages imposed by the 
agency will land much closer to 300% than to 100% of unpaid 
wages.
This is far from the case. OWH does not seriously sanction the 
bad actors who come before it. Last year, through its complaint-
based process, the agency assessed about $483,000 in unpaid wages 
but only about $451,000 in liquidated damages.262 In other words, 
the agency does not even impose liquidated damages of 100% of 
unpaid wages against recalcitrant employers, much less the treble 
damages envisioned by the Wage Theft Prevention Act. Nor does 
OWH collect much money: During the same period of time, the 
agency took in about $194,000 in unpaid wages (40% of the total 
assessed that year) and only $70,500 in liquidated damages (15.5% 






259. D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics v. D.C., 866 A.2d 788, 796 (D.C. 2005).
260. D.C. CODE §§ 32-1308.01(c)(6)–(7) (2017).
261. Id. § 1308.01(c)(4) (2017).
262. D.C. FOIA Data 2019, supra note 220, at 3.
263. Id. OWH also has the authority to level fines and penalties, which flow to the gov-
ernment rather than the aggrieved worker. D.C. CODE § 32-1307.01(b) (2017). The agency’s
collection rate for these sanctions are even worse. In FY 2019, it collected less than 5% of 
what it assessed. D.C. FOIA Data 2019, supra note 220, at 3.
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To summarize: DOES is unaware of the overwhelming majority 
of instances of wage theft that take place in the District. Because it, 
like many enforcement bodies, eschews proactive enforcement 
strategies in favor of passive processes,264 it rarely takes any action 
on behalf of those who suffer wage theft. This includes—by the 
government’s own estimates—more than 99.5% of workers whose 
employers pay them less than minimum wage. When people do 
complain, the agency is slow to contact their employers, process 
their cases, and protect them from retaliation. Finally, once OWH 
does process a person’s claim, it gives employers far more lenient 
punishments than are required by the law, failing to either impose 
meaningful judgments or enforce penalties and collect money.
The slow burn of this process breeds resentment among the 
class of people who have nowhere to turn but to the government 
for help. Frequently, those who go to DOES feel frustrated, disre-
garded, and ill-served. “It’s no good,” says Caleb, speaking about 
the agency’s employees. “[Y]ou come to work, but you don’t go to 
work! [I]t looks like, down DOES, looks like you’re going to 
church. Everybody dressed up, looking good, but you ain’t doing 
nothing!”265
Some people view the government and its employees as ineffi-
cient and unmotivated, if not outright lazy. But others take a much 
more cynical view. It is not just that the government is inefficient. 
The system itself is designed to favor the Haves at the expense of 
the Have-Nots.266 Earl, the journeyman plumber we met in the In-
troduction, is one such cynic. He describes a race to the bottom in 
the construction industry, where contractors refuse to hire District 
residents, deny overtime, pay unfairly low wages, and engage in 
rampant misclassification. “[T]hese companies that have come into 
this city to do work have no licenses to do work, but it’s okay for 
them to work,” he says.267 He does not mean that they are operat-
ing legally. Far from it. Earl’s point is that the city’s leadership is 
not interested in taking meaningful action. “There’s definitely a 
lack of political will! There’s something in it for them. I mean, eve-
ry politician wants something out of it. If I’m gonna do something 
for you, what do I get out of it?”268
The notion that wage theft may be effectively attacked through 
policies of individual empowerment is consistent with the idea that 
264. See Fine, supra note 102, at 361; see also Weil, supra note 186, at 4–5.
265. Id.
266. See Marc Galanter, Why the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal 
Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974).
267. Interview with Earl, supra note 4.
268. Id.
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wage theft is a personal harm best addressed through the passive 
enforcement mechanisms of the civil justice system. But the fact is, 
workers who have their wages stolen do not come forward, even 
when the law reflects the gold standard of anti-wage theft reforms. 
The barriers to claiming are serious, effectively precluding the 
vast majority of low-wage workers—even well-educated ones—from 
pursuing formal legal action. The common thread tying these im-
pediments together is the low status that these people have on the 
social and economic hierarchies of society. But while these prob-
lems are significant, they are not insurmountable. There are con-
crete policy changes that would effectively address these concerns. 
The next Part details what changes must be implemented if juris-
dictions want to do more than just attack wage theft at the margins.
IV. REFORMS IN CONTEXT
This Article has debunked two key ideas about wage theft. First, 
that it is rightly understood as an individual harm; and second, that 
wage theft can be and should be addressed through policy choices 
that, on their face, empower or incentivize private actors to en-
force the law. Although workers’ rights advocates broadly under-
stand that these premises are false, they are still powerful and in-
fluential, and drive both formal legal reform and how the 
government enforces workplace laws.
“Bottom-up workplace law enforcement,”269 which necessarily 
depends on low-wage workers holding employers accountable, is 
destined to fail in its current form. Because of the significant barri-
ers that effectively preclude the vast majority of low-wage workers 
from bringing formal claims, this approach will only ever, at most, 
attack wage theft on the margins. By and large, the workers who do 
come forward and pursue formal rights enforcement fall into two 
groups. First, they are people who have experienced wage theft
that is, to them, uniquely severe or offensive. Ameen, for instance, 
did not pursue formal legal action until his unpaid wages crested 
$40,000 and threatened him with homelessness.270 Lisa stayed silent 
until one egregious week where she worked dozens of hours of 
overtime and still received only her base salary.271
The second group consists of those workers who have left their 
jobs. At that point, the calculus of risk changes dramatically; retali-
ation stops being an overriding concern, and for some, the poten-
269. Alexander & Prasad, supra note 64.
270. Interview with Ameen, supra note 54.
271. Interview with Lisa, supra note 253.
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tial monetary and emotional benefits of bringing a claim start to 
outweigh the expected costs. Recall Maynor, whose eventual wage 
claim ultimately resulted in a $100,000 judgment in his favor.272
Although his wage theft was blatant and damaging, he did not take
action until his employer fired him.
Despite these practical realities, most government agencies rely 
on a passive, complaint-based approach to enforcement.273 This is 
an inherently reactive strategy: the government waits for workers to 
report their employers for wage theft, and then acts to bring those 
specific employers into compliance. It is also ineffective.
But this situation is neither hopeless nor intractable. To mean-
ingfully attack wage theft, jurisdictions must re-orient how they 
think about and address it. They must understand, first, that wage 
theft is a widespread social problem that requires a public response. 
Statutory legal reforms are important, but they must reflect this 
fact and, in recognition of the practical barriers to private en-
forcement, empower institutions to action—not just private individ-
uals. Those institutions must also recognize the inadequacy of pas-
sive, private enforcement schemes and adopt a model of strategic 
enforcement, which focuses on shifting entire industries by cost-
effectively bringing justice to workers instead of waiting for them to 
step forward. This Part outlines the bare minimum of legal and 
strategic reforms that jurisdictions should implement if they hope 
to meaningfully address this problem.
A.  Statutory Changes: Adopting the District of Columbia’s
Enforcement Regime
Standing alone, the District’s statutory reforms are insufficient. 
But they are still a crucial first step, and any jurisdiction concerned 
about wage theft must, at a minimum, adopt them.
To reiterate, D.C. created a legal framework that, on paper, 
promises aggressive rights enforcement. It imposes significant fines 
and penalties and entitles claimants to recover three times their 
unpaid wages as damages. Furthermore, the District’s recordkeep-
ing requirements and generous fee-shifting provisions make it eas-
ier for a larger class of people to find legal representation and 
prove their claim. Perhaps most importantly, D.C.’s recent reforms 
significantly expanded the power of the government to find and 
punish wage theft. The Office of the Attorney General has inde-
272. Interview with Maynor, supra note 161.
273. Galanter, supra note 266.
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pendent enforcement authority,274 and the DOES has broad power 
to investigate, punish, and remediate wage theft.275
The quantitative and qualitative facts about wage theft in the 
District underscore how these reforms have not, for many, lived up 
to their promise. But the city’s legal framework has the potential to 
be incredibly effective and contains tools that could be—and 
sometimes have been—wielded to great effect. Jurisdictions that 
wish to meaningfully enforce basic workplace standards should, at 
a minimum, adopt these same reforms.
B. Additional Reforms: Misclassification and 
Private Institutional Action
Because individuals are extremely unlikely to even attempt formal 
rights enforcement, reforms should empower institutions with new 
authority. This institutional response should come primarily from 
public entities, which are able to collect, distribute, and leverage 
resources in a way that most private actors cannot. But there are 
also non-governmental institutions that can and do play an im-
portant role in labor standards enforcement.
In particular, workers’ rights-based non-profit organizations and 
labor unions are naturally incentivized to find and prosecute wage 
theft. These institutions are ideologically motivated to protect the 
rights of working people and, additionally, unions are directly 
threatened by employers whose labor practices are illegal. This is 
especially true in the construction industry because contracts are 
typically assigned to the lowest bidder, and contractors can cut 
their costs by nearly one-third just by misclassifying their employ-
ees.276 Legal reforms should do more to leverage these institutional 
actors by creating qui tam causes of action regarding independent 
contractor misclassification.
As discussed in Part I, misclassification is a common form of 
wage theft. In addition to the problems already discussed, inde-
pendent contractors are responsible for paying a higher tax rate 
on their earnings than employees. Employees and employers share 
the burden of payroll taxes, with each paying 7.65%; in contrast, 
274. D.C. CODE § 32-1306(a)(2) (2018) (stating that “[t]he Attorney General, acting in 
the public interest, including the need to deter future violations, may bring a civil action . . .
against an employer or other person” who violates various wage and hour laws).
275. See D.C. CODE § 32-1308.01 (2017).
276. Tom Juravich, Essie Ablavsky & Jake Williams, The Epidemic of Wage Theft in Residen-
tial Construction in Massachusetts 1–2 (UMass-Amherst Lab. Ctr., Working Paper, 2015).
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independent contractors, must pay the entire 15.3% themselves.277
These costs quickly add up: a misclassified worker making just 
$20,000 per year can expect to pay an extra $1,530 in taxes.
In most jurisdictions, it is too difficult for private actors to recov-
er the cost of these extra taxes from employers because they can-
not sue for them. There simply is not a cause of action.278 A mis-
classified worker’s only real option is to fill out various forms with 
the IRS.279 The IRS is then supposed to investigate the situation 
and determine whether the filer is an employee or independent 
contractor.280 After that, the IRS might adjust the worker’s tax lia-
bility.281
This process is less direct and more complicated than it should 
be. Future legislative changes should both 1) enable misclassified 
employees to directly sue their employers for overpaid taxes and 2) 
incentivize institutions to action through qui tam provisions.
Qui tam provisions empower private actors to file civil lawsuits to 
enforce a government interest.282 They are most commonly associ-
ated with the federal False Claims Act, although they harken back 
to thirteenth century England.283 Under the False Claims Act, ei-
ther the Attorney General or a private party (called a “relator”)
may sue a third party who has (allegedly) defrauded the govern-
ment by making a false claim for payment.284 After the relator files 
suit, the government has 60 days to investigate and decide whether 
it will prosecute the case.285 If it does, then the relator may still par-
ticipate as a party and is entitled to recover up to 25% of the final 
damages plus reasonable attorney’s fees.286 If the government pass-
277. Randy Gardner et al., Independent Contractor or Employee?, 26 J. FIN. PLAN. 31, 31–32 
(2013).
278. See Glanville v. Dupar, 727 F. Supp. 2d 596, 599–602 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (explaining 
that the broad trend in federal courts is to find there is no private cause of action to sue 
employers for unpaid payroll taxes).
279. In particular, people can assert their employer has unpaid payroll taxes by filing 
Form 8919 with their taxes. See About Form 8919, Uncollected Social Security and Medicare Tax on 
Wages, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/about-form-8919 [https://perma.cc/HVM7-
27BE] (last updated Sept. 22, 2020). Workers may also request a classification determination 
from the IRS by filing Form SS-8. About Form SS-8, Determination of Worker Status for Purposes of 
Federal Employment Taxes and Income Tax Withholding, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/forms-
pubs/about-form-ss-8 [https://perma.cc/83QR-RRBD] (last updated Sept. 20, 2020).
280. I.R.S. Notice 989 (Rev. 8-2015) (2015), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/n989.pdf.
281. Id.
282. Christina Orsini Broderick, Qui Tam Provisions and the Public Interest: An Empirical 
Analysis, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 949, 951 (2007).
283. Id. at 951–52.
284. 31 U.S.C. § 3729; 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1).
285. Id. § 3730(b)(2).
286. Id. § 3730(c)(1), (d)(1).
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es on the case, the relator may pursue it and, if successful, recover 
up to 30% of damages plus attorney’s fees.287
Applying these same principles and procedures to the issue of 
independent contractor misclassification would serve the public 
interest in three ways. First, it would fill a gap in the law, creating a 
way for workers to recover for a distinct harm. Second, it would 
provide a powerful tool for attacking and redressing bad behavior 
by further incentivizing institutions to bring charges. Not only 
would the government learn about viable cases, but non-profit or-
ganizations, labor unions, and private law firms have knowledge, 
resources, and power that individual victims of wage theft do not, 
and therefore have power that ordinary working people lack. Final-
ly, such suits would recover unpaid taxes.
C. Strategic Enforcement: Moving Beyond A Passive Approach
Written legal reforms can only do so much. As important as pro-
tective statutes are, it is just as crucial that policymakers adopt en-
forcement strategies that acknowledge the realities of wage theft 
and account for the barriers that, for all practical purposes, pre-
vent individual rights enforcement. Most government agencies do 
not do this, however. As discussed in Part II, wage and hour en-
forcers largely employ a passive, complaint-based approach.
This is a fundamentally inadequate way to combat wage theft, 
but it is not the only one. In the ongoing conversation about polic-
ing labor standards, there is a concept known as “strategic en-
forcement.” In summary, strategic enforcement is about the effec-
tive use of limited resources to achieve the long-term goal of 
enhancing compliance with basic workplace laws.288 It is “a deliber-
ate approach to change the practices of wage violation that have 
become commonplace in certain industries,” and it does so by 
“tak[ing] account of industry-specific business models, dynamics, 
and regulations with the goal of creating ripple effects that will in-
fluence the compliance behavior of a number of employers at 
once.”289
In part, strategic enforcement requires government agencies to 
adopt new enforcement strategies. But they must also adopt a long-
term mindset, with the goal being to create ongoing, sustainable 
compliance.290 To that end, agencies must do three things: 1) allo-
287. Id. § 3730(d)(2).
288. Weil, supra note 186, at 1.
289. D.C. JUST PAY COAL., MAKING OUR LAWS REAL 4 (2018).
290. Weil, supra note 186, at 12–19.
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cate resources where they will have the most impact; 2) focus on 
changing the behaviors that result in legal violations in the first 
place; and 3) find mechanisms and implement strategies that cre-
ate ongoing compliance.291 This requires agencies to shed their 
long-held passive habits in favor of proactive enforcement efforts, 
shifting resources toward active strategies with the specific goal of 
establishing a robust presence and creating industry-wide cultures 
of compliance. As Professor Janice Fine explains, however, “[t]he 
crisis of compliance in low-wage industries will not be solved by the 
state alone.”292 To be successful, strategic enforcement “require[s] 
creative collaboration between government, workers, organiza-
tions, and—where they exist and are willing to participate—high-
road firms.”293
These ideas might seem intuitive and obvious. But in practice, 
the idea of strategic enforcement stands in stark contrast to how 
most government agencies tasked with remedying wage theft oper-
ate,294 including DOES and similar entities across the country. As 
discussed above, most agencies essentially play whack-a-mole with 
bad employers, only going after them when workers volunteer in-
formation. But low-income people almost never file complaints 
with agencies.
Reactive approaches do not prevent wage theft as effectively as 
proactive ones. They also leave workers open to harm because, by 
definition, the government enters the equation only after employ-
ers violate the law and workers put themselves at risk. While this is 
also true of the civil justice system, unlike courts, many govern-
ment agencies have the explicit authority to seek out violations and 
proactively protect workers’ rights.295 Unless and until they do so, 
wage theft will continue to run rampant in and wreak havoc on the 
lives of working people.
The remainder of this Part outlines the most important strategic 
efforts that government agencies can make to achieve long-term 
deterrence. As discussed below, a smart and systematic strategy re-
quires these entities to: 1) build confidence among stakeholders, 
including workers, community organizations, advocates, and em-
291. Id. at 2.
292. Fine, supra note 102, at 382.
293. Id. “High-road” employers are those who not only follow labor and employment 
laws, but also actively work to provide decent jobs with good wages and benefits. See Principles 
of High-Road Employers, AM. SUSTAINABLE BUS. COUNCIL, https://www.asbcouncil.org
/principles-high-road-employers [https://perma.cc/Z7U9-AYPH]. They are often out-
spoken about the importance of fair and dignified workplaces, and many would be willing to 
work with the government to reduce wage theft.
294. Alexander & Prasad, supra note 64, at 1093–95.
295. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 32-1331.05(a) (2013) (establishing that the Mayor may investi-
gate wage and hour violations “on his or her own initiative”).
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ployers; 2) engage in proactive investigations; 3) educate workers 
about their substantive and procedural rights; 4) utilize all availa-
ble enforcement tools and publicize such activity; and 5) adopt an 
express anti-wage theft mindset.
1.  Building Confidence Among Stakeholders
An effective attack on wage theft necessarily requires workers, 
advocates, and employment lawyers to have confidence in the gov-
ernment agencies responsible for labor standards enforcement. 
Many low-income people, however, express a lack of faith in gov-
ernment, viewing it as a distant thing defined by ineptitude or, 
worse, corruption.296 Others, especially those undocumented, are 
afraid to go to the government for help.297 To address these issues, 
government agencies must strive to forge close working relation-
ships with local actors, including community organizations, advo-
cates, and employment lawyers.
Whether low-wage workers distrust or are afraid of the govern-
ment, stakeholder organizations can serve as trusted intermediar-
ies between authorities and community members. Community 
leaders, labor unions, and advocates interact closely with working 
people, and often have credible knowledge of wage theft. These 
actors are able to conduct outreach, collect information, lend the 
government some measure of their earned trust and prestige, and 
help low-wage workers navigate administrative processes. By tap-
ping into the energy and knowledge of these stakeholders, en-
forcement agencies could vastly improve and increase their reach 
without expending significant additional resources.
Relatedly, government agencies should actively encourage ad-
ministrative participation by educated activists and attorneys. In 
some jurisdictions, this might require legislative reforms entitling 
agency-litigants to recover reasonable attorney’s fees. But even in 
D.C., where there is administrative fee-shifting,298 attorneys and ac-
tivists are reluctant to engage with DOES because they report that 
the agency is unwelcoming and hard to work with.299 Lawyers and 
296. See supra Section III.C.3.
297. See Fussell, supra note 217, at 593–96.
298. D.C. CODE § 32-1308.01(c)(4), 01(c)(6)–(7) (2017).
299. For example, two plaintiff-side attorneys named Owen and Steve shared with me a 
story about their efforts to access DOES’ administrative process on behalf of their clients. 
Owen explained that they attempted to invoke the agency process for some clients, but 
“[DOES] put up so many barriers to actually using it . . . . [T]he net result was that we didn’t 
feel comfortable at all.” Steve added that he “also felt that there was some hostility, frankly, 
to our entreaties or our attempts to invoke it!” Interview with Owen and Steve, Att’ys, in 
Washington, D.C. (2018) (transcript on file with author).
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law school clinics, however, can play an important role. Their par-
ticipation could improve efficiency and justice by helping to en-
sure that proof and arguments meet a high standard. If done right, 
it would also build governmental prestige over time as these stake-
holders become more confident in referring workers.
Finally, agencies should build relationships with high-road em-
ployers, who typically have both a financial and ideological interest 
in wage and hour enforcement. In many industries, these people 
are aware of which of their competitors operate in violation of the 
law, and many would gladly share that information with the gov-
ernment.
2.  Disputing and the Power of Education
As discussed, the vast majority of low-wage people who experi-
ence employment rights violations do not approach the govern-
ment for help. Many of these people stay silent because they do not 
understand their rights, do not know where to go for help, or do 
not believe that the government will be willing or able to help 
them. Agencies could address these key issues through widespread 
education campaigns. These campaigns must teach people about 
their rights, including where to go for help, and draw publicity to 
the problem of wage theft in general.
Standing alone, education is not enough. After all, many of the 
barriers to claiming analyzed in Part III preclude people from 
speaking up even when they are fully aware of both their mistreat-
ment and their legal options. But when almost 80% of low-wage 
workers report that they do not know who to talk to when their 
rights are violated,300 there is obviously much more work to do.
Enforcement agencies should engage in broad and sustained 
campaigns to inform low-income people of their wage-related 
rights. To be successful, agencies must understand the lives of 
working people and make appropriate outreach efforts. Because 
many low-wage workers do not own cars and rely on public transit, 
agencies should place posters and signs on buses and trains. Adver-
tisements should play on local radio stations, including in Spanish 
and other prominent local languages. Most importantly, repre-
sentatives from enforcement agencies should directly engage with 
their constituents by going into community spaces, including 
churches, shelters, and legal clinics. Face-to-face interactions are 
key to making government processes and actors seem accessible, 
300. Alexander & Prasad, supra note 64, at 1095.
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dedicated, and caring. So too are communications through the 
kinds of intermediaries whom community members tend to trust, 
like social service non-profits and neighborhood leaders.
Similarly, the government must engage with and educate em-
ployers. A significant amount of wage theft occurs not out of mal-
ice but because of employer ignorance. Agencies should work with 
employer-side organizations to develop materials that can be used 
to quickly and easily inform employers and managers about their 
legal obligations and the consequences for violating them. Alt-
hough this kind of information is available online, it is not always 
easy to find and understand. It could, however, be disseminated
cost-effectively through existing processes. For example, each time 
an employer applies for or renews a business license, they should 
receive key information about their workplace obligations.
Finally, education campaigns must also draw attention to wage 
theft itself, explaining what it is and why it is wrong. In light of its 
realities, the government should call wage theft what it is: a crime, 
a violation of workers’ fundamental rights, an attack on fair com-
petition, and an affront to the way things should be.
California and Seattle provide models for how the issue should 
be framed. The California Labor Commissioner’s Office has creat-
ed a dedicated, attractive, easy-to-navigate web page about wage 
theft.301 This website has clear information about workers’ rights, 
promises protection from retaliation (even for undocumented 
workers), and has simple directions for filing a variety of com-
plaints.302 Similarly, the Seattle Police Department actively encour-
ages victims of wage theft to file criminal complaints and makes it 
easy to do so through a basic online form.303 These jurisdictions 
have both made rights knowledge easily accessible and defined 
wage theft appropriately.
3.  Adopting a Model of Proactive Investigations
Perhaps most importantly, administrative bodies must move be-
yond their one-off, complaint-based approach to enforcing basic 
workplace laws. The empirical realities presented in this Article 
lead to only one conclusion: the standard, passive approach is des-
tined to fail. Agencies must be proactive. They must bring to bear 
301. See WAGE THEFT IS A CRIME, www.wagetheftisacrime.com [https://perma.cc/DC52-
K7LT].
302. Id.
303. Wage Theft, SEATTLE POLICE DEP’T, https://www.seattle.gov/police/need-
help/wage-theft [https://perma.cc/48FX-PCRJ].
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all of their tools, manpower, and authority to pursue comprehen-
sive investigations. This will require both expanding the frequency 
of directed (agency-initiated) investigations and changing how the 
government responds to individual complaints.
First, all enforcement bodies must prioritize actions and investi-
gations in industries that are rife with noncompliance, including 
service, manufacturing, cleaning, construction, and retail.304 These 
businesses often employ undocumented or otherwise transient 
workers who are especially vulnerable and unlikely to go to the 
government for help. The demographics make investigations that 
much more difficult, but there are clear examples of agencies find-
ing success through smart strategies.
During the Obama Administration, the Wage and Hour Division 
(WHD) of the DOL made significant efforts to conduct more di-
rected investigations in high-risk industries.305 By partnering with 
worker centers, workers’ rights organizations, and labor unions, 
the WHD was able to learn about and take action over schemes 
that otherwise might have flown under the radar.306
Similarly, California’s Bureau of Field Enforcement has adopted 
new and unique strategies. Agents surveil businesses suspected of 
wage theft to gain an understanding of who works there, what typi-
cal shifts look like, and how the businesses are run.307 In recogni-
tion of the insecurity and fear that low-wage workers often have, 
they also conduct off-site interviews with workers prior to physical 
inspections, both to protect these people and to obtain critical in-
formation in a context free of employer coercion and intimida-
tion.308
Government agencies have limited resources, so it is imperative 
that efforts be focused at the greatest points of leverage. A proac-
tive model will include both random audits, like those undertaken 
by departments of health across the country, and vigorous investi-
gations based on credible information about violations. Significant 
weight should be placed on tips provided by worker-friendly organ-
izations, as these groups have credibility in the community and can 
serve as effective intermediaries.309
Finally, complaints that suggest broader problems should trigger 
employer-wide investigations. When multiple people complain, 
agencies should respond decisively by examining the entire busi-
304. See BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 13, at 31; CARRÉ, supra note 26, at 2.
305. Weil, supra note 186, at 9–10, 19–20.
306. Id. at 19–20.
307. Julie Su, Enforcing Labor Laws: Wage Theft, the Myth of Neutrality, and Agency Transfor-
mation, 37 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 143, 151 (2016).
308. Id. at 151–52.
309. Id. at 153; Weil, supra note 186, at 9.
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ness. But even some individual complaints should spark broad ac-
tion. Both Ruben and Lisa, for example, complained to the D.C. 
DOES that they were working long hours without receiving over-
time. DOES found in their favors. Ruben and Lisa also had 
coworkers with the exact same job titles and duties, strongly sug-
gesting that their employers were violating the law across the 
board.310 After all, why would a business classify only one of its em-
ployees with a particular title as exempt from overtime? The agen-
cy should have requested all of their employers’ records for similar-
ly situated employees. It did not. Ruben and Lisa toiled alone, 
which not only decreased the power and the effect of the agency’s
sanction, but also left them exposed to the retaliation they later 
experienced.
4.  Utilizing and Publicizing Enforcement Tools
Passing robust statutes is a crucial first step to addressing wage 
theft, but unused laws are only worth the paper they are printed 
on. Administrative agencies should invoke their full repertoire of 
tools and sanctions, but many do not.
The District illustrates this point. As discussed, the government 
has broad enforcement authority. It may impose significant civil 
and criminal sanctions; workers are entitled to treble damages;311
the Attorney General can criminally prosecute wage thieves;312 the 
government may deny business licenses to those who commit “will-
ful” acts of wage theft;313 and, most importantly, DOES has the ex-
plicit authority to proactively initiate investigations.314
But these powers do not get used. Overall, DOES assesses liqui-
dated damages equal to less than 100% of assessed unpaid wages.315
The Attorney General has not brought any criminal prosecutions 
for wage theft, and the District has not denied business licenses to 
any unscrupulous employers. Proactive investigations are unheard 
of.
Given the widespread prevalence of wage theft and the anemic 
enforcement of wage and hour laws in general, these patterns are 
almost certainly repeated across the country. Utilizing the full 
range of enforcement powers might be a controversial idea to 
some. In particular, the idea of criminal prosecution is conten-
310. Interview with Ruben, supra note 197; Interview with Lisa, supra note 253.
311. D.C. CODE § 32-1308(a)(1)(A)(ii) (2017).
312. D.C. CODE §§ 32-1306(a)(1) (2018); D.C. CODE § 1307(a) (2017).
313. D.C. CODE § 32-1308(i) (2017).
314. D.C. CODE § 32-1331.05(a) (2013).
315. D.C. FOIA Data 2019, supra note 220, at 3.
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tious.316 But while criminal prosecutions probably cannot be the sil-
ver bullet to the heart of wage theft, they can be an important and 
necessary aspect of a thorough and effective enforcement plan. 
First, sometimes they are simply appropriate, either because em-
ployers engage in such egregious schemes that they deserve a 
harsher-than-normal punishment, or because employers are judg-
ment-proof and cannot be effectively punished by monetary sanc-
tions. The kinds of fly-by-night operators who frequently steal wag-
es in the underground economy are, often, effectively immune to 
civil judgments because they simply do not have real assets. Private 
attorneys will not sue them, and even government agencies have a 
hard time leveling monetary sanctions. As Paul DeCamp, the for-
mer head of the WHD under President George W. Bush explains:
[I]t’s a little bit like whack-a-mole. Because a lot of these 
companies, they pop up, somebody hears about a problem, 
that company goes away. The person flees, opens up a new 
company under a different name, maybe in a different 
state, and you can expend an extraordinary amount of . . .
resources trying to track down these folks with [a] ques-
tionable return at the end.317
In these circumstances, there cannot be justice or deterrence 
unless there are criminal sanctions. Prosecutions send a powerful 
message: wage theft is a crime and the government takes it serious-
ly. Bringing and publicizing criminal charges would help inspire 
low-wage workers to trust and cooperate with the government and 
would also signal to employers that they cannot expect to freely vi-
olate the law.
5.  Adopting an Anti-Wage Theft Mindset
Finally, strategic enforcement requires agencies to adopt smart 
strategies and the right mindset. They must always keep overall 
goals in mind and think carefully about how to best apply limited 
resources to achieve long-term, industry-wide compliance. A failure
to embrace this mode of thinking and to understand the lives and 
experiences of low-income victims of wage theft has led govern-
316. See Fritz-Mauer, supra note 12, at 118–20 (discussing the issue of criminalizing wage 
theft).
317. Interview with Paul DeCamp, Member of the Firm, Epstein Becker & Green P.C., in 
Washington, D.C. (2018) (transcript on file with author).
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ment bodies to adopt enforcement strategies that are complaint-
driven and ineffective.
To an extent, the standard approach is understandable. Re-
sponding to complaints yields short-term successes, and evaluating 
investigators based on how quickly they dispose of complaints is an 
easy metric by which to measure progress. But a complaint-driven 
orientation does not create the kinds of cultural shifts necessary for 
long-term deterrence. The best strategy for attacking wage theft is 
not always the one that yields the fastest or most easily-measured 
results. The best strategy is one that builds long-term relationships 
and creates ongoing compliance in an industry as a whole. The 
suggestions in this Part will help accomplish those goals.
For these changes to truly be successful, however, wage and hour 
agencies must also institute organizational shifts. They must adopt 
a clear-eyed and empathetic understanding of what the lives of low-
wage workers are actually like. Many of the people who work at en-
forcement bodies might already have this knowledge, but, broadly 
speaking, that is not reflected in how their organizations operate. 
Simply put, it is entirely unrealistic to expect a passive, individual-
ized strategy to be effective when it is a fact that the vast majority of 
workers whose wages are stolen will never go to the government for 
help.
Some would assert that when agencies adopt the reforms sug-
gested here, they actually hinder their overall mission. The argu-
ment is this: government agencies are supposed to be neutral, un-
biased, and fair. Bureaucratic processes were created, in part, to 
impose neutrality and avoid conflicts of interest. Forging close 
connections with workers’ rights organizations, conducting fo-
cused investigations, declaring wage theft to be a “crime”—all of 
these tactics will decrease the political capital and overall credibil-
ity of an agency by marking it as a partisan and biased actor. This 
mindset is what former California Labor Commissioner Julie Su 
calls the “myth of neutrality.”318 As she explains, the myth consists 
of two underlying premises: first, the government should not ap-
pear to take sides, and second, it should not disrupt the status quo, 
because the normal way of doing things is neutral in some way.319
This is the wrong way to think about the role of an agency like 
DOES or the DOL, and so long as decisionmakers adopt this mind-
set, wage theft will continue to be a widespread and deeply harmful 
social problem. The government bodies responsible for enforcing 
workplace standards are, fundamentally, on the side of the law. 
318. Su, supra note 307, at 148–49.
319. Id.
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That means they are on the same side as workers who experience 
wage theft, and they are also on the side of high-road employers 
who do not commit wage theft but must suffer the unfair competi-
tive consequences. But these agencies are not, and should not even 
appear to be, sympathetic to employers who violate the law. Nor 
should they seem to be neutral regarding those businesses or the 
topic of wage theft itself.
This does not mean that the government should not be fair and 
evenhanded in its enforcement of the law. Far from it. Like the po-
lice, wage and hour bodies are charged with finding, punishing, 
and stopping a crime, and they must do so vigorously. In other 
words, a serious policy solution to this problem does not include 
administrative enforcement agencies accepting wage claims as gos-
pel; it requires only that the agency treat such claims as legitimate, 
serious, worthy of robust investigation and, if credible, deserving of 
all available legal sanctions. Embracing this approach will lead to 
the kinds of institutional cultural shifts that are necessary for stra-
tegic enforcement to work as it should.
CONCLUSION
Wage theft is a pressing problem. It inflames the evils of poverty, 
violates society’s most basic workplace standards, and creates devas-
tating cascading harms. For working people, every dollar matters, 
and the loss of even a relatively small amount of money can threat-
en hunger, homelessness, and the loss of the basic necessities of 
modern life. Workers frequently report powerful feelings of anger 
and depression, as they feel frustrated by and helpless to do any-
thing about their workplace rights violations. These are the facts 
even in the District, which has some of the most robust anti-wage 
theft laws in the entire country.
Individuals are not the only victims of wage theft, though. Every 
year, wage theft siphons billions of dollars away from communities, 
rendering millions more desperate, poor, and vulnerable than they 
would and should otherwise be. It warps labor markets, denies le-
gitimate employers the right to fair competition, weakens key so-
cial safety net programs, and hides billions of dollars from all levels 
of government. It is so frequent, flagrant, and costly that it can only 
be understood as a social problem.
But by and large, our response to wage theft has not accounted 
for its empirical realities. While statutory reforms have been im-
portant and inspiring, they largely rely on individual empower-
ment as the primary means of attacking the problem. Even where 
SPRING 2021] Wage Theft 799
the government has the authority to take significant action, en-
forcement agencies rarely invoke the power of their mandates.
Wage theft is a complex problem, an act that preys upon vulner-
abilities and an ill that plagues society at large. It is old, it is com-
mon, and it will never go away—not entirely. But much more can 
be done. Wage theft can be effectively confronted with thoughtful 
policy solutions. With the right reforms and an understanding that 
public problems require public solutions, institutions can build 
frameworks that much more effectively deter the crime, bring jus-
tice to low-wage workers like Cora, Earl, and Olivia, and make real 
the economic promise that undergirds our system: that an honest 
day’s work deserves an honest day’s pay.

